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MULTILATERAL TRANSPARENCY FOR 
SECURITIES MARKETS THROUGH DLT 
David C. Donald* and Mahdi H. Miraz** 
ABSTRACT 
For decades, changing technology and policy choices have worked 
to fragment securities markets, rendering them so dark that neither 
ownership nor real-time price of securities are generally visible to all 
parties multilaterally. The policies in the U.S. National Market 
System and the EU Market in Financial Instruments Directive—
together with universal adoption of the indirect holding system—
have pushed Western securities markets into a corner from which 
escape to full transparency has seemed either impossible or 
prohibitively expensive. Although the reader has a right to 
skepticism given the exaggerated promises surrounding blockchain 
in recent years, we demonstrate in this paper that distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) contains the potential to convert fragmented 
securities markets back to multilateral transparency. 
Leading markets generally lack transparency in two ways that derive 
from their basic structure: (1) multiple platforms on which trades in 
the same security are matched have separate bid/ask queues and are 
not consolidated in real time (fragmented pricing), and (2) high-
speed transfers of securities are enabled by placing ownership of the 
securities in financial institutions, thus preventing transparent 
ownership (depository or street name ownership). The distributed 
nature of DLT allows multiple copies of the same pricing queue to 
be held simultaneously by a large number of order-matching 
platforms, curing the problem of fragmented pricing. This same 
distributed nature of DLT would allow the issuers of securities to be 
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nodes in a DLT network, returning control over securities ownership 
and transfer to those issuers and thus, restoring transparent 
ownership through direct holding with the issuer. 
A serious objection to DLT is that its latency is very high—with 
each Bitcoin blockchain transaction taking up to ten minutes. To 
remedy this, we first propose a private network without cumbersome 
proof-of-work cryptography. Second, we introduce into our model 
the quickly evolving technology of “lightning networks,” which are 
advanced two-layer off-chain networks conducting high-speed 
transacting with only periodic memorialization in the permanent 
DLT network. Against the background of existing securities trading 
and settlement, this Article demonstrates that a DLT network could 
bring multilateral transparency and thus represent the next step in 
evolution for markets in their current configuration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Shifting securities markets to a communication and registration 
framework of distributed ledger technology (DLT) 1  would allow 
markets to retain multilateral transparency despite their increasingly 
decentralized and fragmented nature.2 The purpose of securities markets 
is to bring together buyers and sellers to contract for the sale and 
purchase of securities,3 and then to facilitate the transfer of title and cash 
between those parties.4 Since about 2000, the bid/ask queue of U.S. and 
European markets has been increasingly fragmented among various 
platforms. 5  And since about 1972, the indirect holding system has 
impeded transparent ownership of securities.6 Use of a DLT network as 
the market’s infrastructural spine could enable distribution of identical 
                                                                                                                 
 1. MICHEL RAUCHS ET AL., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS: A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (Univ. of Cambridge Judge Bus. Sch. The Cambridge 
Centre for Alternative Finance Aug. 2018). We will use the definition of distributed 
leger technology developed by Rauchs et al. The definition is as follows: “A DLT 
system is a system of electronic records that (i) enables a network of independent 
participants to establish a consensus around (ii) the authoritative ordering of 
cryptographically-validated (‘signed’) transactions. These records are made (iii) 
persistent by replicating the data across multiple nodes, and (iv) tamper-evident by 
linking them by cryptographic hashes. (v) The shared result of the 
reconciliation/consensus process—the ‘ledger’—serves as the authoritative version for 
these records.” Id. at 23–24. 
 2. See id. at 45. 
 3. See ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ & RETO FRANCIONI, EQUITY MARKETS IN ACTION: 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LIQUIDITY, MARKET STRUCTURE & TRADING 82 (2004) (“The 
attributes of market quality include transparency, reliability, consolidation of the order 
flow, and easy access to a market, all of which directly affect liquidity and trading 
costs.”). 
 4. Settlement is the “completion of a transaction, wherein the seller transfers 
securities or financial instruments to the buyer and the buyer transfers money to the 
seller.” See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, DELIVERY VERSUS PAYMENT IN 
SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS A2–6 (Sept. 9, 1992). 
 5. See generally FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, FSB REPORT ON MARKET 
FRAGMENTATION 23 (June 4, 2019); see also WALTER MATTLI, DARKNESS BY DESIGN: 
THE HIDDEN POWER IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 108 (2019). 
 6. See, e.g., PAUL MYNERS, REVIEW OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO VOTING UK SHARES, 
REPORT TO THE SHAREHOLDER VOTING WORKING GROUP (2004). 
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information on pricing and holdings to market participants, restoring 
transparency of both the bid/ask queue and ownership. 
The model sketched in this paper goes beyond what has been 
undertaken—or even proposed—to date, as it addresses all market 
functions from pricing to transfer of ownership. Despite the obvious 
attraction of using DLT to defragment market pricing, this has 
apparently not been proposed even by the team charged with 
defragmenting market price data under the U.S.’s multi-billion dollar 
Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) project.7 In securities settlements, with 
the exception of Australia,8 DLT’s announced use has been for marginal 
functions,9 leaving core settlement operations unaffected.10 During the 
                                                                                                                 
 7. This project was launched in 2012 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). SEC Release No. 34-67457 (Aug. 1, 2012) 77 Fed. Reg. 45722 
(“Consolidated Audit Trail”). Current information on the CAT is available at 
https://www.catnmsplan.com/. 
 8. The Australian Stock Exchange is currently rebuilding its Clearing House 
Electronic Subregister System (CHESS) on a platform of DLT, with a completion target 
of 2021. See AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES EXCHANGE, CHESS REPLACEMENT: NEW SCOPE 
AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, ASX (Apr., 2018), https://www.asx.com.au/documents/ 
public-consultations/chess-replacement-new-scope-and-implementation-plan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3HJ6-YQXH]. 
 9. For example, Enterprise Ethereum Alliance—a group of thirty tech giants such 
as Intel and Microsoft, banks such as J.P. Morgan Chase and Banco Santander as well 
as other organizations formed in early 2017—is working towards adaptation of 
Ethereum for the foreign exchange market for global currencies to facilitate the 
settlement layer of the trades. See Robert Hackett, Big Business Giants From Microsoft 
to J.P. Morgan Are Getting Behind Ethereum, FORTUNE, Feb. 28, 2017, 
https://fortune.com/2017/02/28/ethereum-jpmorgan-microsoft-
alliance/?iid=recirc_f500profile-zone1 [https://perma.cc/S8JC-NJWR]; see also Mike 
Orcutt, In 2019, blockchains will start to become boring, MIT TECH. REV., Jan. 2, 2019, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612687/in-2019-blockchains-will-start-to-
become-boring/ [https://perma.cc/J73G-AQ2K]. 
 10. This trend can be seen in the press surrounding the Nasdaq Stock Exchange, 
which in addition to be a securities exchange is also largely a purveyor of technology 
for securities exchanges. Early on, we have announcements of blockchain use that are 
highly marginal. See Martin Arnold & Nicole Bullock, Nasdaq claims to break ground 
with blockchain-based share sale: Fight for bragging rights to ‘first’ transactions 
breaks out, FIN. TIMES, LONDON (UK), Dec. 31, 2015, https://www.ft.com/ 
content/eab49cc4-af18-11e5-b955-1a1d298b6250 [https://perma.cc/2M8G-SRWX]. 
One year later, vague statements about far-reaching change remain: Fredrik Sjöblom, 
The Post-Trade Services Tipping Point, NASDAQ MARKETINSITE (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/post-trade-services-tipping-point-2016-12-14 
[https://perma.cc/7487-RWC7]. And most recently, we have the concrete sales of 
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years of blockchain’s initial spike in popularity, 11  a number of 
institutions adopted marginal blockchain applications rationally 
exploiting the publicity bump that its adoption could provide.12 
However, a large impediment to any significant change of market 
infrastructure is the ratio of cost to benefit. While there is 
encouragement to be drawn from the creation of the Investors’ 
Exchange (IEX) to fight damaging high frequency trading techniques 
that exploited a fragmented market, major infrastructural shifts are far 
from the norm.13 The existing, leading model for securities settlement 
enjoys great respect; replacing it with a relatively untested alternative 
would be unusual behavior for major market participants. 14  If the 
quantitative benefits to core system participants are viewed while 
ignoring negative externalities borne by others, the current arrangement 
                                                                                                                 
technology for special purpose platforms to settle trades in peripheral products (here, 
“settlement of tokenized assets and Singapore dollars”). See Johan Toll, Blockchain 
Takes Major Step Forward with Collaborative Innovation in Singapore, NASDAQ 
MARKETINSITE, (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/blockchain-takes-
major-step-forward-with-collaborative-innovation-in-singapore-2018-08-0 
[https://perma.cc/SK7L-WSR2]. For a discussion of the various initiatives as at the 
close of 2017, see John Manning, How Stock Exchanges Are Utilising Blockchain 
Technology, INT’L. BANKER, (Dec. 18, 2017), https://internationalbanker.com/ 
brokerage/stock-exchanges-utilising-blockchain-technology/ [https://perma.cc/B9WK-
SZS3]. In late 2018, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. announced tangential use 
of blockchain technology in connection with its Stock Connect with mainland Chinese 
markets. See Alun John, Hong Kong exchange turns to blockchain to open up Chinese 
shares, REUTERS, Oct. 30, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/hkex-
blockchain/hong-kong-exchange-turns-to-blockchain-to-open-up-chinese-shares-
idUSL3N1XA4F1 [https://perma.cc/Y3FG-HEJ2]. 
 11. Gartner plots blockchain as coming down from its height of hype in mid-2018, 
entering a stable slope toward eventual application. See Heather Pemberton Levy, 
Understand how blockchain will evolve until 2030 and today’s hype versus reality, 
GARTNER, Oct. 16, 2018, https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/the-reality-of-
blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ74-GABJ]. 
 12. As RAUCHS ET AL., supra note 1, at 91 observed, “meaningful applications and 
implementations of DLT systems in production have rarely materialized to date: most 
projects are still in early trial or pilot phases . . . ‘blockchain’ and ‘DLT’ have become 
almost meaningless buzzwords that are—in many cases—mainly used for marketing 
and PR purposes . . .” 
 13. See generally SEC Release No. 34-78101 (June 23, 2016), 81 Fed. Reg. 41142 
(“IEX Release”). 
 14. This point is made very well by Michael Mainelli & Alistair Milne, The Impact 
and Potential of blockchain on the Securities Transaction Lifecycle, SWIFT INSTITUTE, 
6, 22, 34–35 (2016). 
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and technology of securities settlement used on major markets is fast, 
secure, and profitable, 15  which itself nearly rules out a complete 
overhaul of existing systems with DLT. 
An analysis that casts a wider net than immediate profits accruing 
to core market participants reveals the major flaws of fragmentation and 
indirect holding in contemporary securities markets. Pre- and post-trade 
price information has become fragmented as data transfer enabled the 
creation of alternative trade matching platforms. Regulations under the 
U.S. National Market System (NMS)16 and the EU Market in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) 17  have legalized such platforms. 18 
Because trades in securities listed on a major exchange in the United 
States or the European Union can be matched on any number of venues, 
                                                                                                                 
 15. For 2017, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation reported 369 million 
securities transactions settled with a value of US $1.609 quadrillion, leading to 
revenues of US$1.06 billion, see THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION, 
TURNING HEADWINDS INTO TAILWINDS: 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, DTCC, 64–66 (2017), 
http://www.dtcc.com/annuals/2017/static/pdfs/print-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL7W-
727V]. 
 16. See SEC Release No. 34-51808, “Regulation NMS,” 70 Fed. Reg. 37496 (June 
29, 2005) (Reg NMS), (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 242.600). 
 17. Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 
85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 145) (MiFID 
I). This framework has been replaced by a combination of a directive and regulation: 
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (MiFID II), and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2014 O.J. (L 173) (MiFIR). 
This is discussed in David C. Donald, Bridging Finance Without Fragmentation: A 
Comparative Look at Market Connectivity in the US, Europe and Asia, 16 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 173, 180–88 (2015) (hereinafter Bridging Finance). 
 18. In the United States, 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(82) broadly defines the “trading 
center” matching platform to which Regulation NMS applies, no longer restricting such 
platforms to national securities exchanges: “Trading center means a national securities 
exchange or national securities association that operates an SRO trading facility, an 
alternative trading system, an exchange market maker, an OTC market maker, or any 
other broker or dealer that executes orders internally by trading as principal or crossing 
orders as agent.” In the European Union (under current law) art. 1(19), (21)–(23) the 
monopoly of exchanges has been removed by creating the new general category of 
“multilateral system,” and making “regulated markets,” “multilateral trading facilities,” 
and “organised trading facilities” subcategories under it. 
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pricing information for those securities has become widely 
fragmented.19 Although sophisticated trade routing systems enable the 
largest broker-dealers to navigate this archipelago of platforms, less 
well-armed traders cannot.20 
Market fragmentation is a significant flaw of the current market 
structure that concerns regulators at some level. The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) launched the multi-billion-dollar CAT 
infrastructure project in 2012 to repair this fragmentation at least for 
end-of-day data.21 The EU rules provide for an analogous institution of a 
Consolidated Tape,22 although it remains more of a hoped-for volunteer 
post than a realized project.23 
Regulators have not publicly examined distributed ledger 
technology as a means of distributing pricing data. Instead, they have 
picked up the light mood found in companies adopting some token 
blockchain as publicity. 24  For example, the position taken by the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)—which is in line 
with popular sentiment—is that DLT can offer efficiency, transparency, 
security, and reduced counterparty risk to markets. 25  The ESMA, 
                                                                                                                 
 19. This follows from the nature of pricing in securities trading, which occurs 
when “bid” and “ask” orders are submitted to the matching platform by potential buyers 
and sellers of a given security, so that the order queue of each matching platform will 
generate its own price when orders match, triggering a trade. 
 20. The “arms race” of technology between broker-dealers has led to a significant 
reduction in the number of licensed broker dealers, as smaller competitors are no longer 
able to afford the technology necessary to remain competitive. For an analysis of this 
phenomenon, see David C. Donald, From Block Lords to Blockchain: How Securities 
Dealers Make Markets, 44 J. CORP. L. 1, 52–53 (2018) [hereinafter: Block Lords]. 
 21. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.613(c)(7)(i)-(vii) (2016). 
 22. The name “consolidated tape” refers to the traditional “ticker tape” that showed 
execution or matching price for two orders throughout the 20th century. The purpose of 
this consolidated tape would be “make it easier for market participants to gain access to 
a consolidated view of trade transparency information that is available.” MiFID II, 
Preamble 117. 
 23. Private persons may create a consolidated tape provider (CTP) and seek to be 
licensed to perform the under article 65 of MiFID II. No such CTPs have been 
registered as seeking authorization. 
 24. EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY (ESMA), THE DISTRIBUTED 
LEDGER TECHNOLOGY APPLIED TO SECURITIES MARKETS, ESMA Report, 26–33 (Feb. 
7, 2017), https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files_force/library/dlt_report_-_esma50-
1121423017-285.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMK3-BTP2]. 
 25. See id. 
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however, has not gone into detail on how this would occur or made any 
concrete proposal for implementation.26 
Our model as presented in this paper would make order-matching 
venues nodes of a DLT network, so that the ledger protocol itself would 
replicate pre- and post-trade data on all copies of the ledger, restoring 
pricing information automatically.27 
Beyond fragmentation of pricing information, the second major 
flaw in current market structure is its dependence on giving ownership 
of traded securities to a central placeholder—usually a central securities 
depository (CSD), but also sometimes the CSD’s participant broker-
dealers (“street names”).28 This damages property rights and rules out 
transparency, which impedes exercise of investor rights and triggers 
needless “corporate action” fees. 29  Shifting ownership to financial 
intermediaries has created the highly problematic “indirect holding 
system”30 that gives financial intermediaries not only ownership of listed 
securities, but also the power—by booking securities to an account—to 
create securities for their accountholders, although those securities 
might never have been issued by the company against which they create 
a claim. 31  This power to “over-issue” securities arises because the 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See id. 
 27. This is what the U.S. CAT is designed to do, and the European Union has also 
projected the creation of consolidated tapes (“CTs”) in order to serve the same function, 
although there are no current plans to force industry to build one of volunteers are not 
forthcoming. 
 28. This is the industry standard that was expressed nearly twenty years ago in 
COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS & TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (CPSS-IOSCO), 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, CPSS-IOSCO Joint Task 
Force on Securities Settlement Systems, Recommendation 6 at 13 (Nov. 2001) (“The 
costs and risks associated with owning and trading securities may be reduced 
considerably through immobilisation of physical securities, which involves 
concentrating the location of physical securities in a depository (or CSD)”), 
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d42.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9UN-NDLN]. 
 29. See David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the Core of the U.S. 
Proxy System and its Solution, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41, 49 (2011) (hereinafter 
Darkness). 
 30. This is defined in U.C.C. § 8 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. ST. L. 2017). 
 31. Under U.S. law, a booking to account by a securities intermediary actually 
creates property in security called a “security entitlement.” See U.C.C. § 8-503 (2018). 
Investigation of the related problems were conducted by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) before the Depository Trust Company (DTC) was 
created in 1972 and continued until the U.C.C. was restructured in the 1990s. For a 
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“securities” actually traded are the claims on account, requiring law to 
make the booking itself a security (an asset backed by the original 
security) albeit requiring the financial institution to eventually procure 
the underlying securities to back up the booking.32 If we compare over-
issue to the better known context of securitization, it would resemble a 
“synthetic securitization” in which the bonds issued are not backed by 
underlying mortgages.33 However, in the indirect holding system, there 
is no need to label the arrangement as “synthetic.” But in a DLT-based 
securities settlement system, ultimate evidence of ownership could 
remain on the books of the issuer, which would operate as a node in the 
DLT network, thus returning ownership of securities to the economic 
owners and returning full power over the creation of securities to their 
issuers. 
A potential—and quite significant—drawback of decentralizing 
securities markets through DLT is the difficulty of retaining the central 
counter-party (“CCP”) function, which can only operate by centering 
market risk and authority to debit and credit accounts on the CCP. 
Notably, the CCP contains the impact of a default only after it occurs. 
As CCPs absorb all counter-party risk in the market—yet are backed by 
all participants—they essentially are a network backing a single entity, 
responding in remedial fashion to default.34 
In a DLT network, however, order-matching platforms are nodes 
with full information on the trading positions of market participants. 
                                                                                                                 
presentation of the history of these concerns and efforts, see Donald, Darkness, supra 
note 29, at 54–59. The problems of property and commercial law, discussed below, are 
examined in DOROTHEE EINSELE, WERTPAPIERRECHT ALS SCHULDRECHT: 
FUNKTIONSVERLUST VON EFFEKTENURKUNDEN IM INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSVERKEHR 
144–149 (1995). More recent studies of disruption through complexity of 
intermediation and lack of transparency are MYNERS, supra note 6, and U.K. 
DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION & SKILLS (BIS), EXPLORING THE 
INTERMEDIATED SHAREHOLDING MODEL, BIS Research Paper Number 261 (Jan. 14, 
2016). 
 32. See U.C.C. § 8 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. ST. L. 2017). 
 33. In a synthetic securitization, contract rather than property rights protect the 
cash flows promised from the underlying mortgages, because “the securitization . . . 
[occurs] with the financial institution retaining legal ownership of the underlying loans 
(as opposed to a traditional structure, where the originator sells these loans to the 
securitization issuer in return for a payment financed by an issue of notes).” JASON H.P. 
KRAVITT & EDMUND PARKER, SECURITIZATION FIN. ASSETS § 20.03 (2019). 
 34. Froukelien Wendt, Central Counterparties: Addressing Their Too Important to 
Fail Nature 5, 10 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 15/21, 2015). 
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Similar to a CCP on a derivatives exchange, much of the CCP risk 
management function could be made preventative. Matching venues 
within a DLT network could screen the cash, securities, and trading 
positions of participants before matching their orders, and throw any 
order backed by an unsatisfactory asset position to the back of the 
queue. This would provide preventative risk management for a purpose 
that CCPs on stock exchanges have only been able to provide remedial 
default containment.35 If the latency of the screening could be reduced to 
an acceptable interval, such preventative measures would dramatically 
improve the risk management of securities trading and settlement 
systems.36 
Moreover, incorporating matching venues within a DLT network 
could also address a new and growing fear arising from the current 
settlement model: excessive concentration of risk in central 
counterparties. 37  An additional risk-sharing and allocation agreement 
among broker-dealer nodes of the DLT network could contain risk not 
visible to the matching platform, much as done today in stock exchanges 
with the market backing the CCP. 
This Article sets out in detail the reasons for and design of the 
model sketched in the preceding paragraphs. Part I examines the 
principal components of the currently dominant securities market 
structure, highlighting what works, how pricing information has been 
fragmented, what distorts property rights and transparency, and what 
could be improved most by a transition to DLT. Part I further explains 
the effects of multiple matching venues on pricing transparency, how 
transfers of ownership could be returned to issuers, and the operations of 
central counter-parties and our alternative that operates preventatively. 
Part II then presents the key technical aspects of a DLT network 
with a focus on the applications most important to securities markets. 
Part III finally outlines the core operational concept of our proposed 
model using a DLT-based trade matching and settlement system, with a 
focus on the significant improvements and other changes it would bring. 
In particular, Part III explains that the DLT network would be 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See id. at 15. 
 36. See Paul Lagneau-Ymonet & Angelo Riva, Market Information as a Public 
Good: The Political Economy of the Revision of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID), in FINANCE: THE DISCREET REGULATOR—HOW FINANCIAL 
ACTIVITIES SHAPE & TRANSFORM THE WORLD 134, 15 (Isabelle Hault & Chrystelle 
Richard eds., 2012). 
 37. Wendt, supra note 34, at 4. 
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private/permissioned, giving authority over the booking of security 
ownership to issuer nodes, employing a “lightning network” to reduce 
latency, and making trade-matching nodes gatekeepers for 
preventative—rather than remedial—risk management. The final part of 
this Article summarizes the details of the model and concludes. 
I. THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF SECURITIES MARKET 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. THE DILEMMA OF FRAGMENTING MARKETS 
Electronic trading has permitted the closing of trading floors and 
the multiplication of trade-matching venues, so that any platform 
connected to the market network can receive orders and match them.38 
This disintegration of matching venues was encouraged in the United 
States and the European Union as a way of pitting matching-venues 
against each other to reduce trading fees and stimulate innovation 
through competition.39 Fees did decrease, and competition also spurred 
innovation, but the result was a fragmentation of liquidity among 
scattered pools and of pre- and post-trade information, fragmenting price 
discovery, and impeding effective market oversight.40 Where traditional 
securities markets were dominated by a single matching platform at the 
close of the 20th century, order matching today is dispersed around tens, 
if not hundreds, of matching engines.41 
Fragmentation of liquidity means that there are fewer bid and ask 
orders on any given sub-venue than there would be if all orders were 
concentrated on a single order-matching platform, like that of a 
traditional stock exchange.42 Pre-trade information is the order book for 
a given matching venue, showing existing limit orders posted by market 
participants.43 Post-trade information is the price at which a given trade 
is executed, essentially the ticker tape publicly visible on websites like 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See SEC Release No. 34-51808, “Reg NMS,” 70 Fed. Reg. 37496 (June 29, 
2005) (Reg NMS), (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 242.600). 
 39. See id. 
 40. Xiangkang Yin, A Comparison of Centralized and Fragmented Markets with 
Costly Search, 60 J. FIN. 1567, 1584 (2005). 
 41. Donald, Block Lords, supra note 20, at 55. 
 42. Yin, supra note 40, at 1580. 
 43. SCHWARTZ & FRANCIONI, supra note 3, at 158. 
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Bloomberg.44 When a single security is traded on fifty different order-
matching venues, that number of bid/ask queues and execution prices 
will exist.45 Although a participant’s order routing tools are designed to 
seek out the venue with the most favorable price, modern market 
structure can hamper this.46 
While leading market participants employ expensive technology to 
navigate the multiple platforms, gathering, comparing and consolidating 
the queues, this is not possible for all traders. 47  For smaller market 
participants that have neither the size nor the technology to trade 
simultaneously on many platforms, this reduces liquidity because it 
isolates pockets of buyers and sellers from each other, and tends to 
create uneven pricing for the same security on different matching 
platforms. 48  The arrangement thus leads to the kind of structured 
inequality of resources that Mattli has recently revealed in his political 
economy of the securities markets.49 
The United States launched the CAT project in 2012 to tie back 
together the post-trade information—the price at which bid and ask 
orders are matched—generated at various venues. 50  This CAT is 
designed to provide only post-trade information to regulators,51 and thus 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at 362–63. 
 45. As discussed above, securities market prices are “execution” prices at which a 
bid and ask order match. Each platform has its own order queue—indeed, that is the 
entire purpose of the platform’s existence—so each platform creates its own execution 
price. If in the United States only the NYSE were to match orders, then its queue and 
execution price would be the market price, but when fifty platforms are matching orders 
in NYSE-listed securities, there will be fifty different execution prices, fifty different 
market prices. 
 46. See, e.g., Guido Ferrarini, Market Transparency and Best Execution: Bond 
Trading under MiFID, in PERSP. IN COMPANY L. AND FIN. REG. 477, 479–80 (Michel 
Tison et al. eds., 2009). 
 47. Lagneau-Ymonet & Riva, supra note 36. 
 48. Id. at 150. 
 49. See MATTLI, supra note 5, at 106. 
 50. Joint Industry Plan; Notice of Filing of the National Market System Plan 
Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail, 81 Fed. Reg. 30614, 30615 (April 27, 2016) 
[hereinafter 81 Fed. Reg. 30614]. 
 51. See id. (“In performing their oversight responsibilities, regulators today must 
attempt to cobble together disparate data from a variety of existing information systems 
lacking in completeness, accuracy, accessibility, and/or timeliness—a model that 
neither supports the efficient aggregation of data from multiple trading venues nor 
yields the type of complete and accurate market activity data needed for robust market 
oversight.”). 
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will not correct the problem of a market participant that might not have 
information on the bid-and-ask prices being considered at the countless 
different matching platforms in the market. Nevertheless, the CAT 
project team estimates $9 billion in sunk costs to put the CAT into 
operation for its first year. 52  The project’s published plans make no 
mention of introducing DLT into the system.53 
Using current technology, fragmentation results from creating 
multiple matching-venues that run their own order book and collect data 
using bid and ask orders from the various market participants trading on 
the matching-venue.54 As explained in Part III.B, if each order-matching 
venue were to be a node in a DLT network and the data among the 
nodes were to be shared on a layer 2 “lightning network,” the chain 
technology itself could ensure that each matching venue has the 
aggregate of all pre- and post-trade information in the network. The 
matching platforms, broker-dealers and the regulators would be nodes in 
the network with access to this information, and the problems arising 
from fragmentation would be eliminated. 
B. INDIRECT HOLDING THROUGH CUSTODY ACCOUNTS 
As securities markets collapsed under modern trading volumes in 
the late 1960s, introduction of the indirect holding system conquered the 
monumental administrative task of transferring millions of securities 
daily by simply ceasing most actual transfers of securities.55 Securities 
certificates were immobilized in a CSD and registered in its name, the 
name of its nominee or that of an upper-level intermediary.56 Although 
                                                                                                                 
 52. The SROs that devised the CAT plan project “initial aggregate cost to the 
industry related to building and implementing the CAT would range from $3.2 billion 
to $3.6 billion. Estimated annual aggregate costs for the maintenance and enhancement 
of the CAT would range from $2.8 billion and $3.4 billion. Additionally, costs to retire 
existing systems would be approximately $2.6 billion.” 81 Fed. Reg. 30614 at 30726-
27. 
 53. Current information on the project is available at 
https://www.catnmsplan.com/. 
 54. 81 Fed. Reg. 30614 at 30672. 
 55. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, U.C.C. 
TEXT ART. 8 COMMISSIONERS, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017). 
 56. The history of this development is set forth in the following paragraphs, but it 
is useful to note at this time that the securities can be registered with the issuer (i) in the 
name of the CSD, (ii) in the name of a company that the CSD establishes as its nominee 
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the technique was already more than 100 years old when advocated in 
the 1970s, 57  it was—and remains—effective for the needs of fast 
transfer, albeit what is actually transferred remains open to 
interpretation. 
The modern indirect holding system began in New York during the 
early 1970s.58 Exchange-traded securities—then in paper form—were 
deposited in the vaults of the Depository Trust Company (DTC) and 
registered with the issuer in the name of its nominee, Cede & Co.,59 
which was henceforth the actual legal owner of these securities. Cede & 
Co. held them for one or another of its participating banks or securities 
dealers, and transferred claims on its accounts rather than the securities 
themselves.60 When federal law in 197561 ordered the SEC to provide for 
“immobilization” of securities in depositories,62 Cede & Co. came to 
legally own over 99 percent of U.S. listed securities, 63  with the 
remainder in its street names. This quickly became the global norm.64 
                                                                                                                 
expressly for this purpose, or (iii) in the name of a broker-dealer, in which case the 
broker-dealer would hold a segregated account for those securities at the CSD. 
 57. THEODOR HEINSIUS ET AL., DEPOTGESETZ: KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ÜBER DIE 
VERWAHRUNG UND ANSCHAFFUNG VON WERTPAPIEREN § 5, margin no. 1 (1937). 
 58. The history of this major market structure change is set out in Donald, 
Darkness, supra note 29. 
 59. PETER NORMAN, PLUMBERS AND VISIONARIES: SECURITIES SETTLEMENT AND 
EUROPE’S FINANCIAL MARKET 41, 84 (2007); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, U.C.C TEXT ART. 8 COMMISSIONERS, 
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017). 
 60. EGON GUTTMAN, 28 MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS § 2:12, Westlaw 
(database updated May 2018). 
 61. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q–1(e) (2016). National system for clearance and settlement 
of securities transactions. 
 62. See Regulation of Clearing Agencies, 45 Fed. Reg. 41920 (June 23, 1980) (to 
be codified 17 C.F.R. pt. 21). 
 63. In 2004 DTCC’s General Counsel Richard B. Nesson estimated that 
“somewhere north of 99%” of the depository-eligible securities in the United States 
were included within the DTCC system. See Interview with Richard B. Nesson, 
Managing Director and General Counsel, and Donald F. Donahue, COO, The 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (Nov. 11, 2004), 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/programs/2004/[https://perma.cc/TA8K-YBT4]. 
 64. The global norm for many aspects of financial market structure can be 
discerned from what is recommended by the high-level international bodies, the Bank 
for International Settlements and the Group of Thirty. The key components of the 
indirect holding system are recommended in both BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS, COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS (Nov. 2001), 
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Electronically agreeing that a securities dealer holds claim to 
something booked in a custody account is faster and simpler than 
actually transferring the securities. Actual transfer entails (i) delivery of 
the share certificate from seller to buyer, (ii) cancelling the share of 
seller and seller’s entry in the register of shareholders, (iii) issuing the 
buyer a new certificate, and (iii) entering the buyer in the register of 
shareholders.65 Such entry in the register of shareholders entitled the 
investing buyer to voting and dividend rights.66 The indirect holding 
arrangement, by contrast, resembled a mille-feuille pyramid in which 
ownership held by the CSD and its top-level participants trickled down 
to lower-layer brokers and eventually to ultimate “beneficial owners,” 
while claims of uncertain definitions from beneficial owners aspired 
upward to levels above.67 Thus, although fast and secure, it is unclear 
exactly what is being held and transferred with such speed in this 
indirect holding system. 
An investor’s claim on a depository holding a security does not 
constitute a property right under conventional principles of law, which 
can have nasty consequences if the intermediary becomes insolvent.68 In 
the United States, a property right for this essentially contractual 
relationship was created through amendment of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), article 8, in the form of the “security 
entitlement.”69 Outside of the United States, the assertion that a claim on 
a custodian—which is essentially in personam70—can be a property 
                                                                                                                 
[https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d46.pdf https://perma.cc/9MY4-FDKR] and GROUP OF 
THIRTY, GLOBAL CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT: A PLAN OF ACTION (2003),  
https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_GlobalClearingSettlement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9DDA-V95Z]. 
 65. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
U.C.C. TEXT ART. 8 COMMISSIONERS, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017). 
 66.  Under Delaware law, the relevant provision is § 219(c) DELAWARE GENERAL 
CORPORATION LAW (“The stock ledger shall be the only evidence as to who are the 
stockholders entitled by this section to examine the list required by this section or to 
vote in person or by proxy at any meeting of stockholders.”) Dividends are paid out to 
the same list of stockholders. 
 67. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
U.C.C. TEXT ART. 8 COMMISSIONERS, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See DAVID C. DONALD, DER EINFLUSS DER WERTPAPIERABWICKLUNG AUF DIE 
AUSÜBUNG VON AKTIONÄRSRECHTEN, 124–25 (2008). 
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right has been strongly contested, 71  and a UNIDROIT convention 
drafted in the early 2000’s to internationalize U.C.C., article 8, has never 
entered into force.72 
The U.S. solution, however, has the disadvantage of allowing every 
booking to a custody account to create a security—analogous to a bank 
creating money by issuing credit—even if no securities exist to back up 
the booking.73  This power to create securities is tied directly to the 
newly minted property right, for if a customer of a custodial bank 
actually owns a property interest thanks to a book-entry on account, 
there must really be a security behind that property interest, whether it 
has been issued or not.74 As a result, if a securities dealer books 50,000 
shares of IBM Corporation to a buyer’s account, the buyer really owns 
the “security entitlement” on those shares, even if IBM never issued the 
shares.75 That can lead to unwelcome consequences when the shares are 
voted or dividends on such shares are demanded. 
                                                                                                                 
 71. These arguments with regard to German law are brought together by EINSELE, 
supra note 31, at 119. With regard to U.K law, see Roy Goode, The Nature and 
Transfer of Rights Dematerialised in Immobilised Securities, in The Future for the 
Global Securities Market: Legal and Regulatory Aspects 107, 120–27 (Obitah ed., 
1996). On French law, see Didier R. Martin, La théorie de la scripturalisation, 20 ANS 
DE DÉMATÉRIALIZATION DES TITRES EN FRANCE 55, 61 (De Vauplane, ed. 2005). Under 
U.S. law, there is no problem of a property right because the U.C.C. has declared that 
the essentially in personam right against a securities custodian will be considered a 
property right. To advance a convention embodying this U.S. position, the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) has assembled a guide 
showing how an account relationship could be understood to constitute a property right. 
See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, GUIDE ON 
INTERMEDIATED SECURITIES (2017), https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-
markets/legislative-guide (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 72. The UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities 
requires ratification by three countries, but between completion in 2009 and this writing 
in 2019 only Bangladesh has agreed to ratification. See UNIDROIT, Status of the 
UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (Oct. 9, 
2009), https://www.unidroit.org/status (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
 73. U.C.C. § 8-501(b)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMMM’R ON 
STATE LAW 2018). 
 74. U.C.C. § 8-501 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’R ON STATE 
LAW 2018). 
 75. As already stated, under § 8-504, the securities dealer will be responsible for 
procuring the securities created through booking, but if it cannot the problem of over-
issue will affect the issuer of the securities, particularly when rights are exercised, such 
as during a shareholder meeting or a battle for corporate control. 
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Another major flaw of indirect holding is the famous problem that 
security holdings are completely opaque.76 Issuers of listed securities 
might only have one name—that of Cede & Co. or another CSD in other 
markets—in their register of shareholders. 77  The actual shareholders 
become “beneficial owners” with a claim against their broker, which 
holds a claim against an upper-tier institution, which may hold a claim 
against a CSD.78 The legal rights of shareholding belong only to the 
registered owner—in the United States, probably Cede & Co.—and 
must themselves be transferred or exercised in agency to govern the 
corporation.79 The “beneficial owner” is visible only to the next level 
up.80 Simple processes like calling annual shareholder meetings, voting 
at the same or making and accepting takeover offers become highly-
convoluted affairs,81 mediated by long chains of intermediaries for a 
“corporate action” fee.82  These financial intermediaries, registered as 
shareholders, not only receive “corporate action” fees, but also enjoy the 
position of indispensable go-betweens in all shareholder relations 
because the issuers and the actual shareholders cannot communicate, or 
indeed, even have a legally binding relationship, without going through 
the intermediaries.83 
Each of these problems arise from giving financial intermediaries 
primary ownership and control of listed securities—first through a 
depository relationship and then through the same arrangement even 
after securities certificates have been dematerialized. From the 
standpoint of data management, the indirect holding system makes the 
data about securities creation and ownership endogenous to the financial 
system. 84  The existence and control of such securities depends on 
neither their issuer nor the “owner” who ultimately paid for their 
purchase.85 Transfer is fast and efficient because it remains endogenous 
                                                                                                                 
 76. This is examined in detail in Donald, Darkness, supra note 29, at 59–62. 
 77. See id. at 62. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 49. 
 80. See id. at 73. 
 81. See generally MYNERS, supra note 6. 
 82. MICHAEL SIMMONS & ELAINE DALGLEISH, CORPORATE ACTIONS: A GUIDE TO 
SECURITIES EVENT MANAGEMENT 23–31 (2006). 
 83. See id. at 30. 
 84. This is an important conceptual aspect emphasized by RAUCH ET AL., supra 
note 1 in their analysis of DLT. 
 85. See Donald, Darkness, supra note 29, at 46. 
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to the financial system and under the control of financial intermediaries, 
with only records of secondary claims being communicated to outside 
parties such as issuers and investors.86 The costs are a loss of property 
rights, the risk of over-issued “shadow” securities created by book 
entries and opacity of securities ownership. 87  The indirect holding 
system has since the 1970s made financial intermediaries indispensable 
parties in the creation, transfer, and ownership of securities by 
displacing issuers and alienating investors from direct ownership.88 
As explained in Part III.C, infra, if securities are again evidenced 
only on the books of the issuer and thus exogenous to the financial 
system, transfer will be possible through booking of the security on the 
register of members, and investor ownership would be complete and 
transparent.89 
C. CENTRAL COUNTER-PARTY RISK CONTAINMENT 
If all securities traded on a market are placed within a closed 
environment of accounts, as is done by the indirect holding system, it is 
possible to give one person the right to access and make transfers 
between those accounts.90 If then all obligations arising from matched 
orders within the market are novated to insert that person as an obligor 
within every contact, it becomes the seller to every buyer, and the buyer 
from every seller, and thus a central counterparty.91 
The CCP can use its authority to access all assets to reduce the risk 
of non-delivery or non-payment, and if such failure does occur, the CCP 
is in the position to absorb and slow the contagion effect of any such 
default.92 The CCP’s strength in this position is bolstered by the support 
that every clearing participant is obliged to give through funding a 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See id. at 56–57. 
 87. See id. at 99. 
 88. See id. at 54. 
 89. As distinguished from a “security entitlement,” which is a kind of claim backed 
by a security, a true uncertificated security exists only on one register and is transferred 
by simple debit and credit booking (essentially constituting delivery of the security). 
See GUTTMAN, supra note 60, at 162–63. 
 90. See Ivana Ruffini and Robert S. Steigerwald, OTC Derivatives—A Primer on 
Market Infrastructure and Regulatory Policy, FED. RES. BANK OF CHICAGO ECON. 
PERSP. 80-81 (2014). 
 91. See id. 
 92. THORSTEN V. KOEPPL AND CYRIL MONNET, THE EMERGENCE AND FUTURE OF 
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., 2010). 
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guaranty reserve, contracting insurance, or both. 93  In derivatives 
exchanges, the CCP is further strengthened by receiving real time 
information about the trading positions and available assets of market 
participants and being vested with authority to demand that such market 
participants post margin payments or otherwise reduce their risk profile 
on the market.94 
CCPs are understood to be one of the most useful components of 
the currently-dominant securities settlement framework.95 They greatly 
reduce the systemic element of counter-party risk by inserting an entity 
backed by the entire market as every transaction’s counterparty.96 On a 
derivatives exchange, they also gather full information about market risk 
because they know both the trading and asset positions of their 
counterparties.97 As is well known, the use of CCPs was the primary 
prescription to cabin risk from over-the-counter derivatives transactions, 
following the global financial crisis.98 If CCPs have a disadvantage, it is 
that their concentration of risk in a single entity can make them “too big 
to fail.”99 
Real time reaction to information makes the CCP risk management 
on a derivatives market generally more comprehensive than in a stock 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Robert R. Bliss and Robert S. Steigerwald, Derivatives Clearing and 
Settlement: A Comparison of Central Counterparties and Alternative Structures, FED. 
RES. BANK OF CHICAGO ECON. PERSP. 22 (2006). 
 94. On CCPs, see id. See also THORSTEN V. KOEPPL AND CYRIL MONNET, THE 
EMERGENCE AND FUTURE OF CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., 
2010); THORSTEN V. KOEPPL AND CYRIL MONNET, THE EMERGENCE AND FUTURE OF 
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES, Fed. Res. Bank of Phila. Working Paper 10-30 (2010), 
www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/workingpapers/; Marc 
Hollanders, A look at the rapidly changing market infrastructure supporting the OTC 
derivatives markets, 4 J. SEC. OPERATIONS & CUSTODY 7 (2011); Yee Cheng Loon and 
Zhaodong Ken Zhong, The Impact of Central Clearing on Counterparty Risk, Liquidity, 
and Trading: Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market, 112 J. FIN. ECON. 91 
(2014). 
 95. COMMITTEE ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS & TECHNICAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, 
supra note 28, at 12. 
 96. See Bliss, supra note 93, at 28. 
 97. See id. at 25–26. 
 98. GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY, GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT (Jan. 15, 2009), 
http://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_FinancialReformFrameworkFinSt
ability.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC3L-M4YG]. 
 99. WENDT, supra note 34, at 5. 
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market.100 In a stock market, the CCP becomes the buyer to all sellers 
and the seller to all buyers, and then backs all positions through its 
access to securities and cash within the system and with the strength of 
the market’s guaranty mechanism.101 In the case where one or more 
market participants do not perform on a matched trade, the action taken 
is designed to absorb an existing shock.102 
In a derivatives market, the CCP constantly scans the trading 
positions, paid-in margins and perhaps available collateral of system 
participants, asking them to adjust margin payments, and depending on 
the specifics of the system, even limit their trades according to position 
limits. 103  This additional CCP function is preventative in nature and 
manages risk much more effectively than unlimited access to resources 
in the case of a default.104 Increasing the preventative functions of a CCP 
would thus augment its risk management capabilities. 
We propose that the order-matching platforms within a DLT 
network be given both all information on bid/ask queues and the type of 
information available to a CCP on a derivatives market. As explained in 
Part III.D, infra, this would allow the order-matching platform to move 
orders to the back of the queue if it is not satisfied that the broker-dealer 
can perform. This preventative risk management could be coupled with 
a loss-sharing commitment among broker-dealers, similar to the network 
of remedial guaranty functions already used to support a CCP.105 In this 
way, it should be possible for a trading and settlement system in the 
shape of a DLT network not only to reproduce, but also to improve upon 
the risk management functions of a CCP. To achieve the required 
latency, the protocol of the DLT network would use programmatically 
executed transactions (PETs), which are smart contract triggers for trade 
matching or rejection of orders to execute loss-sharing commitments.106 
This will be discussed in detail in Part III.C, infra. 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Ruffini & Steigerwald, supra note 90, at 86. 
 101. Id. at 86. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Richard Squire, Clearing Houses as Equity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857, 857–70 (2014). 
 104. See id. at 858. 
 105. See Bliss & Steigerwald, supra note 93, at 27. 
 106. RAUCHS ET AL., supra note 1, at 37. 
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D. MULTILATERAL NETTING 
Netting, also referred to as “clearing,” is considered a core function 
of securities settlement systems, and is the reason why these systems are 
referred to as “clearing houses.”107 From the perspective of the securities 
settlement system’s apex, multilateral netting of obligations owed 
among participants of the CSD can eliminate almost all transaction 
volume, dramatically reducing strain on the system’s inner core.108 In 
2010, the last year that Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC) publicly reported the netting efficiency of the National 
Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), it netted out 98 percent of 
transaction volume in each of the years from 2006 to 2010.109  This 
steady ratio of 98 percent corresponds to the portion of the market’s 
securities held through the accounts of upper-level participants in DTC, 
for it is the commonality of obligations among those participants that 
allow them to be netted. 110  Without common offsetting obligations 
between debtor and creditor, it is impossible to achieve an offset of what 
the two parties should pay to each other.111 This commonality occurs 
because most of the securities traded on an exchange are held in the 
accounts of apex entities.112 The netting of obligations among such apex 
entities holding direct accounts with DTC—and therefore accessible by 
NSCC—does not indicate an overall reduction of transaction costs per 
trade, but only a reduction of those transfer costs incurred at the 
system’s apex.113 Netting cannot eliminate the need for investors at the 
periphery of the system to make payments and deliver securities because 
such investors have no commonality of obligations with other such end 
users. 
For example, if on a given trading day, a Boston resident enters into 
securities transactions with a profit of $1000, while a Miami resident 
enters into transactions with a profit of $1100, there is no commonality 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See Squire, supra note 103, at 862. 
 108. See id. at 869. 
 109. THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION (DTCC), SAILING TO THE 
END OF THE MAP: ANNUAL REPORT 2010, 25 (DTCC 2010), 
http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/About/Annual-Reports/2010_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RWM-BPDM]. 
 110. See id. at 5. 
 111. See Squire, supra note 103, at 867. 
 112. See Donald, Darkness, supra note 29, at 61. 
 113. See id. at 15. 
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of obligation between them and it would never be a solution for the 
Miami resident to receive just $100 and the Boston resident zero, as the 
net of the credits held by each. This happens at the system apex because 
a handful of major broker-dealers have a very high share of the market, 
trade with each other, and settle these trades through accounts on the 
CSD.114 This would likely not even be the case for the brokerages used 
by the respective investors in Boston and Miami, even if each of them 
engages Citibank as its global broker. At least for claims on account, the 
cash and securities due will have to be sorted out and passed down the 
pyramid to the end users. Assertions of the great efficiency of netting 
are thus possible because any security traded in the U.S. market has a 99 
percent chance of being legally owned by Cede & Co. or one of DTC’s 
core clearing participants.115 However, the ability to net out the claims of 
top-level DTC participants in this way does not mean that the thousands 
of obligations passed up through the capillary system of correspondent 
arrangements from local houses during the same settlement cycle can be 
ignored. 
As the accumulation of securities ownership in the omnibus 
accounts of apex intermediaries decreases, the volume of fungible 
obligations that can be netted out against each other also decreases.116 If 
through a DLT network or otherwise, each investor owns securities 
directly, rather than having ownership moved to and bundled in a central 
group of intermediaries or the CSD’s nominee, the percentage of 
nettable claims would be dramatically reduced. Commonality of 
obligations might remain only among institutions engaged in high-
volume proprietary trading. Nevertheless, if a DLT network were to 
operate on a lightning network intraday, as explained in Part III.D, infra, 
it would be possible for market participants to go in and out of a position 
many times per day, with only the final position being settled. This 
would reduce transaction costs and could reduce the ultimate settlement 
volumes. Because ultimate attribution of claims to securities for 
transactions fully settled would be the result of such intraday 
transactions, the effect at closing would reduce system stress, albeit not 
through formal netting. 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION (DTCC), supra, note 
109, at 45. 
 115. See id. at 34. 
 116. See id. at 13. 
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II. THE TECHNOLOGY OF DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS 
A. DIRECT ACCESS TO TRANSACTION DATA IN AN ADVERSARIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Distributed digital ledger technology—such as blockchain—
requires chronological records, i.e., “blocks” mathematically configured 
to behave in certain ways regarding requests for alteration, to be 
available on all the participating devices (“nodes”) of its network, and 
operates in an adversarial environment. A DLT ecosystem is essentially 
a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) network.117 How new content is added to blocks 
depends on whether the ledger is “permissionless” or “permissioned.”118 
In each case, however, read access to the data can be granted to all the 
participants, even in an adversarial environment. 119  Achieving this 
successfully requires a high level of security and privacy control, which 
is attained by cryptographic hashing algorithms as well as encryption 
mechanisms using a combination of private and public “keys.”120 
The possible contribution of DLT to securities clearing and 
settlement requires an examination of both the theoretical potential of 
blockchain technologies and their actual capabilities in the near term. 
Our analysis therefore entails scrutiny of three facets: (i) how 
cryptographic hash functions secure the chain, (ii) how the ledger 
architecture regulates its own modification, and (iii) how consensual 
control of the ledger occurs and affects operational latency. 
                                                                                                                 
 117. RAUCHS ET AL., supra note 1, at 22 define an adversarial environment as being 
“characterised by the presence of malicious actors within a system or network, who 
undermine the system by using it in ways it was not intended for. The prototypical 
adversary in a DLT system is an entity that attempts to exploit the consensus rules to 
transfer assets without authorisation, censor others’ transactions, or otherwise disrupt 
the network. Adversaries may operate inside or outside the system.” 
 118. See id. at 30. In a permissionless blockchain ecosystem, anyone can freely and 
voluntarily join the network and have both write and read access—such occurs in 
Bitcoin’s blockchain. In a permissioned blockchain ecosystem, joining the network is 
restricted to some specific nodes and write and read access is usually predetermined by 
a set of system rules. 
 119. See id. at 30. 
 120. See id. at 28. 
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B. THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTION OF “HASHING” AMONG BLOCKS 
The most prominent type of DLT is blockchain, which was initially 
developed for Bitcoin.121 In its simplest form, a blockchain is a phalanx 
of digital blocks joined by interlocking encrypted data like the rings of a 
chain.122 That is, each block contains the cryptographic “hash” of the 
previous block.123 As a blockchain is used, blocks are added through 
transactions recorded as interlinked data, propagating the chain.124 These 
transactions could be the creation of a new unit of value such as a 
Bitcoin, a transfer of such unit from one owner to another, or the 
memorialization of other information on the ledger. Because the ledger 
constituted by these blocks is held by each participating node, it is 
known as a distributed ledger network.125 
Each chain has a “genesis block” marking the start of the chain.126 
The genesis block may contain instructions and procedures for the 
operation of the chain, which could be rules on the creation of new 
assets and establishing consensus, code for a smart contracts, or policy 
statements. 127  In a ledger serving a securities trading and settlement 
system, the genesis block could contain rules and procedures on 
verification of available funds and securities, how to match trades within 
the system, requirements for consensus on settlement, performance of 
payment, and transfer of title to securities. 
This Article recommends use of a private/permissioned ledger for 
trading and settlement, which would give extensive control to the largest 
and most influential market participants—a feature that some readers 
                                                                                                                 
 121. In cryptography, keys are used to encrypt and decrypt data. In asymmetric 
cryptography—also commonly known as public key cryptography—a mathematically 
bound pair of private-public keys are used. A public key is used to encrypt data while a 
private key is used to decrypt the encrypted data. These keys are simply non-identical 
very large numbers which are mathematically paired together. Another important use of 
these keys is digitally signing and verifying documents. In blockchain systems, public 
keys are often used as the account (more commonly known as wallet) identifier—
analogous to any bank account number. Such use of public key requires the key to be 
unique within the blockchain network. See id. at 28. 
 122. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN 
(2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSG3-EYD7]. 
 123. Mainelli & Milne, supra note 14, at 3. 
 124. Satoshi, supra note 122, at 2. 
 125. Mainelli & Milne, supra note 14, at 3. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
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may see as undesirable. To that end, it is important to understand the 
operation of public and permissionless ledgers and the problems that 
they present. Modification of the ledger is self-regulating in a public and 
permissionless system—like Bitcoin—because blocks are added to the 
chain by completing a “Proof-of-Work” (“PoW”) mathematical puzzle 
that requires considerable computing power and “hashes” the digital 
ledger of transactions against alternation.128  In Bitcoin, completing a 
PoW puzzle is referred to as “mining”129 and originated with Adam 
Back’s HashCash.130 The rules for Bitcoin’s blockchain provide that a 
transaction initiated by a node broadcasting it to the blockchain network 
is only complete upon validation by the other nodes. 131  These 
transactions remain “unconfirmed” and must be assembled with other 
unconfirmed transactions into a “candidate block,” which itself must be 
validated through PoW and consensus.132 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See RAUCHS ET AL., supra note 1, at 55. 
 129. Satoshi, supra note 122, at 3. 
 130. Mining in Bitcoin BC is analogous to mining of gold or any other valuables. In 
Bitcoin BC ecosystems, supply of new Bitcoin (BTC) is only made available by 
mining. Mining also serves as an incentive, more commonly known as block reward, 
for the miners (participating nodes). As of July 2018, 17.1 million of BTC has been 
mined which is 81.43 percent of the planned cap of maximum 21 million. It may seem 
that if 81.43 percent of BTC is mined in nine years since BTC started its journey in 
2009, the remaining of the BTCs will be mined within a very short while. However, this 
is not going to be the case as the block reward is halved every 210,000 blocks, which is 
approximately every four years. In 2009, the initial block reward was fifty BTC, which 
fell to 12.5 BTC by 2017, and it is estimated this will be further halved by 2020, so that 
the remaining 18.57 percent of BTC would be mined around 2140. See Jamie Redman, 
80% of the 21 Million Bitcoins Have Been Mined Into Existence, BITCOIN.COM NEWS 
(Apr. 27, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/80-of-the-21-million-bitcoins-have-been-
mined-into-existence/ [https://perma.cc/832H-Y3QP]. Once all 21 billion coins are 
mined, the Bitcoin BC ecosystem could run solely on transaction fees and adopt Proof-
of-Stake (“PoS”). There is debate whether mining will remain economically beneficial 
enough for mining to continue, the rising price of BTC due to “controlled supply” is 
one of the major grounds why it may continue. 
 131. Adam Back, Hashcash—A Denial of Service Counter-Measure (Aug. 1, 2002), 
http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PB6-R2TC]. 
 132. Mahdi H. Miraz & David C. Donald, Application of Blockchain in Booking and 
Registration Systems of Securities Exchanges in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
COMPUTING, ELECTRONICS & COMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING, ICCECE 35–40 (Aug. 
2018), available at https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8658726 [hereinafter 
Application of Blockchain]. 
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The life-cycle of a transaction in a public and permissionless ledger 
has several phases, including transaction formation, broadcast to the 
network, verification and validation through PoW, and consensus.133 In a 
DLT network facilitating a securities market, examples of transaction 
formation include a broker-dealer placing an order to buy or sell a 
security, or an issuer creating a new share of stock. In a public network, 
these would be broadcasting to peer nodes, which would verify and 
validate the same, adding them to a pool of unconfirmed transactions. 
Unconfirmed transactions would then be selected for incorporation into 
a candidate block for solution of the PoW puzzle. Once the puzzle is 
completed, the block would be sealed and broadcasted for validation.134 
Consensus of the nodes over validation would add the block to the 
existing chain. Rauchs et al. refer to this process using the phases of 
transaction, log, record, journal and ledger, in which the “record” stage 
is equivalent to an unconfirmed transaction and the “journal” is the set 
of records found in a candidate block. 135  Thus, in a public and 
permissionless ledger, all participating nodes would have a certain 
unacceptable amount of control over both a broker-dealer’s trading 
choices and the existence of securities created by a given issuer.136 
Permissionless ledgers are self-sufficient; they do not require an 
active administrator to protect against unauthorized alteration because 
the embedded encryption and connected validation process serve this 
control function autonomously.137 This could provide desired neutrality 
of administration in a securities market but would almost certainly lead 
to unacceptable levels of latency. A PoW puzzle requires calculating the 
hash of the block at a difficulty level set by the historical speed of 
solution, which at mid-2018 was approximately 10 minutes for the 
Bitcoin blockchain.138 This high latency means that a given node itself 
will have a very limited scale during a given time frame, leading to a 
restricted scalability for the entire network. For a securities market in 
which 3,000 different assets might be traded at a given moment, this 
would likely be a fatal defect. 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See RAUCHS ET AL., supra note 1, at 19. 
 134. Id. at 60–65. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. at 74. 
 137. See id. at 68. 
 138. Mahdi H. Miraz & David C. Donald, Atomic Cross-chain Swaps: Development, 
Trajectory and Potential of Non-monetary Digital Token Swap Facilities, 3 ANN. OF 
EMERG. TECH. IN COMP. (AETIC) 42, 42–43 (2019) [hereinafter Atomic Swap]. 
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Capped transaction throughput, resulting from the decentralized 
PoW and consensus approach, remains at the center of all concerns 
associated with scalability of blockchain based applications. A further 
significant disadvantage of permissionless DLT is the way PoW is 
forced to evolve within its environment, particularly by the adjustment 
of the difficulty level.139 For example, Bitcoin’s transaction capacity is 
seven per second on average, while that of Ethereum is 15 per second; 
Ripple’s capacity in this regard is much higher, at 1500 transactions per 
second, but still much lower than Visa, which can process 24,000 
transactions per second on average.140 That said, choices by nodes acting 
in a given ledger according to fees or other incentives could cause an 
unconfirmed transaction to take several days to complete settlement.141 
Traffic also significantly affects latency.142 The queue time in Ethereum 
is thus exponentially increasing due to mushrooming use from Initial 
                                                                                                                 
 139. The Bitcoin mining difficulty level is a measure of how difficult the PoW 
puzzle actually is—to find a SHA-256 hash of a block’s header. To claim successful 
completion of the PoW puzzle and be accepted by the Bitcoin ecosystem, the calculated 
hash must be equal to or lower than the target. The mining difficulty is adjusted after 
every 2016 blocks, i.e. a duration of roughly two weeks, using the following simplified 
version of the formula: 
 
ܰ݁ݓ	ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ	ܮ݁ݒ݈݁ ൌ 	ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ	ܦ݂݂݅݅ܿݑ݈ݐݕ	ܮ݁ݒ݈݁ ∗ ൬	ܧݔ݌݁ܿݐ݁݀	ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	ܶ݅݉݁ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ	ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	ܶ݅݉݁ ൰ 
Thus the ratio resulting in ቀ	ா௫௣௘௖௧௘ௗ	஺௩௘௥௔௚௘	்௜௠௘஺௖௧௨௔௟	஺௩௘௥௔௚௘	்௜௠௘ ቁ determines the difficulty level of PoW 
puzzles for the next 2016 blocks created. If greater than 1, the difficulty level increases, 
and if less it decreases. If the difficulty level decreases or remains the same throughout 
the life cycle of the Bitcoin ecosystem, blocks will be created faster because of the 
increase in computing power (pursuant to Moore’s Law, and perhaps even a super-
accelerated leap through quantum computing) and a larger number of miners and their 
collaboration in pools. The system must compensate by raising the PoW difficulty level 
in order to dampen the block generation rate. The maintenance of an average block 
generation rate has protected the Bitcoin ecosystem from attacks by malicious miners. 
Any block that does not meet the set PoW target will be rejected by nodes in the 
network and become worthless. 
 140. See Richard MacManus, Blockchain Speeds & The Scalability Debate, 
BLOCKSPLAIN (Feb. 28, 2018), https://blocksplain.com/2018/02/28/transaction-speeds/ 
[https://perma.cc/D4HF-XVBE]. 
 141. Miraz & Donald, Atomic Swap, supra 138, at 43. 
 142. Id. at 42–43. 
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Coin Offerings (ICOs), Decentralised Autonomous Organization 
(DAOs), and Decentralised Apps (DApps).143 
This high latency arising from calculation of the hashed block 
header is perhaps the largest drawback for financial market use.144 The 
hashed block header, however, cannot be eliminated because it is the 
backbone of the PoW security model. 145  An alternative approach is 
Proof-of-Stake (“PoS”), which is used in permissioned (private) 
ledgers.146 Unlike PoW, a chain using PoS assigns certain nodes the 
authority to add to the ledger based on proportionate holding of assets in 
the chain.147  For a private/permissioned ledger, it is also possible to 
assign authority to given nodes in mutual agreement or by means of 
other authority.148 Such nodes would have power to create blocks on the 
ledger. The blocks in a permissioned system using PoS or another model 
are linked with an agreed pattern hashing, rather than through hashing 
set at a level of difficulty.149 PoS offers lower latency, allowing more 
transactions to be processed per unit of time, but also requires a closed 
network, which shifts responsibility for the network’s security back to a 
system rules framework agreed among participants and away from 
automatically executing code. As will be discussed in more detail in Part 
III, we recommend use of a private/permissioned network because it 
offers the low latency necessary to match and settle securities 
transactions. 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Ethereum is not just a cryptocurrency network; rather it offers blockchain as a 
service. Individuals or organizations aiming to develop their own blockchain or smart 
contract-based applications may use the Ethereum blockchain platform to run their 
applications, which includes launching ICOs or other DApps. 
 144. See Slimcoin, A Peer-to-Peer Crypto-Currency with Proof-of-Burn, SLIMCOIN 
WHITE PAPER (May 17, 2014), https://github.com/slimcoin-project/slimcoin-
project.github.io/raw/master/whitepaperSLM.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGV9-PT7A]. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Another emerging variant to these predominant approaches, which is 
considered not only to be supportive of the green-computing movement but also having 
substantial economic contributions towards the adopting cryptocurrency, is the “Proof-
of-Burn” (“PoB”) modus operandi introduced by Iain Stewart. See id. Unlike PoW, the 
computational cost of solving the mathematical puzzle is replaced in PoB with a solely 
monetarily expensive task, i.e., to “burn” some coins by transferring them to an address 
where they are blocked and cannot be spent. 
 148. Slimcoin, supra note 144. 
 149. See id. 
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To grasp the network linkage among blocks, their durability against 
unintended replication, and the activity performed in PoW, a look at a 
block’s internal components is useful. As mentioned above, the genesis 
block is quite different from the others, as it can contain smart contracts 
specifying rules for node verification and validation or for the routine 
operations of the ledger ecosystem. As shown in Figure 3.1 below, a 
block contains a version number (4 bytes), a hash of the previous block 
(256 bytes), a timestamp in seconds (4 bytes), a “nonce”—which is a 
one-time password or key (4 bytes), the current difficulty level (4 




The hash function is based on an algorithm that accepts any size 
data input, but is restricted to a fixed size output known as the “hash 
value” or simply the “hash.” 150  Creating a hash is simple, but 
deciphering the key input factors is impossible even if the algorithm is 
known.151 A hash is non-reversible because changing even a single bit of 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Bitcoin blockchain uses a hashing technique called SHA-256 of the SHA-2 
family whereas Ethereum blockchain uses Keccak-256, both of which produce digests 
(hash value) of 256 bits. RIPEMD160 is a cryptographic hash function that produces 
160 bit of hashes. Bitcoin uses both RIPEMD160 and SHA-256 simultaneously. To 
further tighten the security threshold, hashing function is used twice in Bitcoin 
blockchain. For addresses, Bitcoin blockchain uses RIPEMD160 (SHA-256 (key)) and 
for other purposes blockchain uses SHA-256 (SHA-256 (data)). The use of 
RIPEMD160 enables the addresses to be shorter, as it generates the shortest hashes 
whose uniqueness is still guaranteed to an adequate degree. 
 151. See Slimcoin, supra note 144. 
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the input data produces a completely different hash.152 Hash values are 
also known as “message digests” or simply “digests.” 
Such application of hashing techniques protects the chain against 
falsification or alternation even without a monitoring authority.153 Once 
the genesis block and other protocols are written, the structure of a 
permissionless DLT network alone ensures that bookings on the ledger 
are authorized.154 
Ledgers use a Merkle Tree arrangement155 so that the blocks need 
not preserve full individual hashes of each transaction because 
information in the common “root” joining the “leaves” is a sufficient 
marker, which substantially reduces file size.156 The Merkle “root” is a 
hash, efficiently constructed from the contributions of all the hashes 
included in any particular block of the chain. 157  Figure 3.2 below 
exemplifies a Merkel Tree as used in Bitcoin blockchain. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 152. For this demonstration, we used an online Hash Generator that facilitates SHA-
2 (256 bit) Hashing using UTF8 Character Encoding which is freely available at 
https://dev-tips.org/Generators/Hash/SHA256. In the instance of a small change in the 
original text–such as “a” instead of “o”–the pattern of the hash changes significantly, 
e.g., “securities depositary” produces a digest of “AC9D1A02E7E1224A75 
A1C6FD800399A22BF9878E70D4373FF0770DAC34D50380” while “securities 
depository” generates an output of “4BBA914A3AB03BACC3556A2B476E 
87DD7D1D7F1912A58CEE683E08826D49F900.” Hash inputs are also case sensitive, 
e.g., “securities depositary” generates a digest of “92D6EEBDC1ED6B56302323A1F 
FFB3088414146E9F07D98591FFB8F6E75411AC4” while securities depository results 
in a digest of “6D2D92614BAA776F8CEC63C26DD97B28AC65B02B74048881956 
CFFAAC84399DC.” When upper case “A” and “O” are replaced with lower case “a” 
and “o,” the hash becomes completely different. The hash of a hash produces a 
completely new hash, e.g., “The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog” produces a 
digest of “D7A8FBB307D7809469CA9ABCB0082E4F8D5651E46D3CDB762D02D0 
BF37C9E592” which, if used as an input, produces another digest of 
“616687DF387FAEFAB7E9800C3CBDC97C1701A82622E9939BF59A2BD98319AC
6A.” The outputs (i.e., hashes) in all six cases are of same length regardless of the size 
of the inputs (i.e., the original texts). In this case, the length is 64 hexadecimal digits 
equivalent to 256 binary bits. 
 153. RALPH C. MERKLE, PROTOCOLS FOR PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS, IEEE SYMP. 
ON SEC. AND PRIVACY 122, 126 (1980). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 125–27, 129. 
 157. See id. at 124–27. 
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Figure 3.2 
 
Whether a ledger is permissionless or permissioned, the hashing 
protects the ledger’s data: if a verifier addressing the scenario depicted 
in Figure 3.2 wants to ensure that a third party has not tampered with 
transaction Tx4, he may request the server to confirm that the 
transaction Tx4 has been included in the block. The server returns the 
hash of Tx3 which is H3 as well as H12, H5678 and H12345678. 
Verifier calculates: H4 from Tx4, then H34 from given H3 and 
calculated H4, then H1234 from given H12 and calculated H34, and 
finally H12345678 from given H5678 and calculated H1234. If the 
given and the calculated versions of the Merkle Root (H12345678) are 
the same, the transaction has been properly included in the block.158 This 
arrangement also enables participants to calculate the Merkle Root and 
any intermediate nodes to verify that transmitted data has not been 
altered, allowing efficient verification for audit purposes without having 
to examine the actual records behind the root.159 Because this technique 
is also present in permissioned ledgers, data integrity and immutability 
for such arrangements would not depend alone on enforced authority 
and data access rules among the permissioned parties.160 This process is 
more secure than current market infrastructure designs.161 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See id. at 125, 128. 
 159. See id. at 124, 132. 
 160. European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), The Distributed Ledger 
Technology Applied to Securities Markets, 2017 ESMA REPORT 1, 4, 6. 
 161. See Shashank Bilonia, Blockchain Technology—Unfolding the Technology 
Behind Bitcoins, EDUREKA!, https://www.edureka.co/blog/blockchain-technology/ 
[https://perma.cc/APM8-TR9W] (last updated May 22, 2019). 
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C. DATA DECENTRALIZATION THROUGH DISTRIBUTION 
The standard settlement system of a major securities exchange is 
highly centralized, concentrating a very large portion of the securities 
traded within a network of accounts held by a CSD and giving the CCP 
information from and power over those accounts.162 Indeed, the first 
word of these two key institutions is central. The primary advantages of 
the decentralization found in a DLT network are (1) replication of data 
identically in all copies of the ledger, (2) consensus governance, and (3) 
no single point of failure (SPF) vulnerability. 163  As central 
counterparties are perhaps the strongest component of existing systems 
and decentralization is a key feature of any DLT system, any evaluation 
of DLT for securities settlement must understand how the distributed 
nature of a DLT network can still aggregate overall data as if it were 
centralized.164 
A DLT network is defined by how its nodes interact. 165  The 
blockchain network, for example, clusters together various technologies: 
(a) cryptographic algorithms, (b) distributed network, and (c) programs 
such as the blockchain protocol.166 Each network node computing device 
will hold its own copy of the entire ledger and will interact with and 
contribute to conserving the consistency of the chain using this cluster 
of technologies.167 
Cryptographic algorithms predetermine much of a ledger’s 
operation. 168  Transactions are initiated with a private/public pair of 
cryptographic keys, and each public key—which is known throughout 
the network—will correspond to only one private key.169 A transacting 
node digitally “signs” the transaction by encrypting it with its private 
key, which can then be decrypted by other nodes using the 
corresponding public key.170 As De Filippi points out, this resembles an 
                                                                                                                 
 162. European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), The Distributed Ledger 
Technology Applied to Securities Markets, 2017 ESMA REPORT 1, 4, 6. 
 163. See id. at 4. 
 164. See Bilonia, supra note 161. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE 
RULE OF CODE 20–21 (2018). 
 170. See id. at 14–15. 
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email system in which each user has a public identity—their email 
address—and a private password to open, write and read email.171 The 
main difference is that in a DLT network, the public key is locked to the 
private key mathematically so that one cannot be changed without 
changing the other.172 This allows independent action by each network 
node and would be the same in both permissionless and permissioned 
networks. 
Distribution enables the consensus aspect of network operation.173 
Once a transaction is accepted upon application of the public key, it is 
considered “unconfirmed” and queued as a candidate for addition to the 
ledger.174 At this point, if the ledger is permissionless, miners compete 
to solve the PoW puzzle by adding the nonce in calculating the hash 
value of the block header that matches the current target value, as 
explained above. When the puzzle is solved, the block is broadcasted to 
the network. 175  Other nodes then validate the transaction by 
recalculating the hash, adding the block to their copy of the ledger.176 
This consensus control—like other systems dependent on majority 
control 177 —remains secure as long as the share of the computation 
power of the honest nodes exceeds the share of computation power of 
the dishonest nodes. If a dishonest node has a minority position, the 
other nodes will not accept its solution of the PoW with altered data if 
the solution does not match the unconfirmed transactions they have on 
record. Thus, consensus building according to this preconfigured 
autonomous nature of a DLT model could force the system into default. 
In a permissioned network with assigned authorities to specific nodes, 
the problem would be reduced. Of course, the extra-protocol problem of 
consensus in assigning these authorities at the time of system creation 
would still exist, as it does in any federated system with assigned 
powers. 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See id. at 24, 29, 31, 74. 
 172. See id. at 21–22. 
 173. See Bilonia, supra note 161. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See DE FILIPPI et al., supra note 169 at 25. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Majority control of stock corporations, which appears simple at first glance, is 
subject to every kind of strategic gaming and abuse, which has led to legal remedies 
such as the unfair prejudice action under U.K. law and the action applying a controlling 
shareholder’s fiduciary duty under U.S. Delaware law. 
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The above procedures secure public or permissionless networks 
like Bitcoin, Ethereum, Factom, and Blockstream. 178  A private or 
permissioned network—like the proprietary systems currently used for 
clearing and settlement—would allow only “trusted” nodes to read and 
write on the ledger.179 Permission can be granted at different levels, so 
that different types of nodes have authority to read differing types of 
information and only certain nodes have authority to write on the ledger. 
Private blockchain ecosystems are already operated by Eris 
Industries, Blockstack, Multichain, and Chain.180 In 2015, Chain joined 
NASDAQ in a partnership to allow the secure issue and transfer of 
shares in privately-held companies on a blockchain ecosystem, dubbed 
NASDAQ Private Market (NPM).181 The main difference between this 
system and the traditional securities settlement model is that power is 
distributed to key system participants as opposed to being aggregated in 
the CCP.182 The model we propose in Part III would give diverging 
types of authority to three different classes of system participants: order-




                                                                                                                 
 178. See DE FILIPPI et al., supra note 169 at 31. 
 179. See Laura Shin, Nasdaq Selects Bitcoin Startup Chain To Run Pilot in Private 
Market Arm, FORBES, June 24, 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/ 
06/24/nasdaq-selects-bitcoin-startup-chain-to-run-pilot-in-private-market-
arm/#664f473583d5 [https://perma.cc/F3FG-7J7E]; see also John McCrank, Nasdaq 




 180. See Miraz & Donald, Application of Blockchain, supra note 132, at 38. 
 181. See Shin, supra note 179. 
 182. Although a CCP is in all instances a corporation backed by all market 
participants with capacity to hold accounts in the CSD and accept transfers between 
those accounts as executed by the CCP, the corporation is much like a placeholder for a 
network of these participants because they provide guarantees in various ways for its 
debts. With the model we recommend, the network does not require a placeholder 
corporate body to unite it because it is held robustly in place by the distributed ledger. 
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D. REDUCING LATENCY WITH LIGHTNING NETWORKS 
In Part II.C, we explained that a private/permissioned network can 
achieve more favorable latency than a public/permissionless one. 
Nevertheless, even a private DLT network would be too slow to 
compete with current data transmission on securities exchanges.183 This 
is the result of two architectural limitations that a number of people have 
attempted to overcome—a lack of interoperability and a lack of 
scalability.184 Thus, the initial blockchain technology developed as a by-
product of Bitcoin 185  has seen a significant rise in multifaceted 
domains.186 
In the challenge to achieve interoperability between different 
cryptocurrencies or colored coins, the recent development of variant 
“atomic swap” mechanisms hold great potential. The term “atomic” is 
commonly used in database system terminologies to indicate a binary 
output, meaning that the action will happen either entirely or not at 
all. 187  “Atomic swaps” in blockchain ecosystems are direct P2P 
exchanges of crypto assets between two parties in which the swap 
process occurs at a binary level governed by coding—such as 
cryptographically powered smart contract technology—rather than any 
centralized intermediaries. 188  Atomic swaps eliminate the need for 
legacy exchanges, as there remains no risk of default—both the parties 
have full control and ownership of the crypto assets dedicated to the 
transaction until it takes place, and then transfer to the counterparty 
occurs fully and automatically.189 Viewed legally, performance is not 
subject to any kind of condition or unwinding.190 
Depending on the architecture of the DLT ecosystem and the 
location of the interim transaction, atomic swaps can be “on-chain” or 
“off-chain.”191 The swap is “on-chain” if the interacting DLT systems 
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are technologically homogeneous.192 “Off-chain” swaps have been made 
possible by the recent invention of “lightning networks” that are able to 
join technologically heterogeneous DLT systems.193 An off-chain swap 
using a lightning network occurs away from the base chains on a 
completely separate layer known as “second layer” or “layer 2.”194 
Lightning network technologies were developed for general 
application in 2017 and hold the potential to reduce latency, thereby 
allowing DLT to provide its inherent benefits to the user at greater speed 
and scalability.195 The adjective “lightning” is used because data can be 
transferred instantaneously between nodes on a second channel layer 
that is not subjected to a consensus process.196  This second layer is 
powered by a Hashed Timelock Contract (HTLC)-based smart contract, 
enabling bi-directional payment channels built on top of the base layer 
of DLT.197  Nodes of homogeneous DLTs can also benefit from the 
speed of lightning networks.198 At its simplest, this use occurs when two 
parties—nodes in DLT networks—agree on a shared private key for the 
swap, and the swap of their crypto assets will take place on a second 
layer only if the counterparties use the same private key.199 
A HTLC backing of the lightning network enables bi-directional 
payment channels through a second layer built on top of the base DLT 
layer.200 Lightning network transactions occur through “matching” of 
shared keys, rather than through a classic consensus approach. Thus, 
along with offloading the transactions from base channel, lightning 
networks enable instantaneous transfers of assets with near-zero 
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transaction fees. 201  Once such a channel is established, unlimited 
transactions can take place between the interacting parties.202 Only the 
netted balance—once the channel is closed or both the parties cease to 
transact—is broadcasted to the base layer DLT network for consensus as 
a single transaction, which is subject to validation and verification by 
the DLT nodes.203 
Lightning networks allow secure routing of transactions between 
two parties who are not directly connected by any point-to-point channel 
using secure “onion style” routing across multiple P2P channels.204 In 
ordinary routing, the packet contains the address of the final destination 
and the next hop address.205 The intermediate hop—usually a router or 
switch—replaces the next hop address every time the packet passes 
through them, based on the path determined by the routing algorithm 
used.206 Thus, the final destination is known to everyone, although the 
message itself—the transaction data—would remain secure because it 
would be protected by end-to-end encryption.207 In onion style routing, 
the path of the transmission is pre-determined and layered like an 
onion.208 Each intermediate node will peel off one layer to exclusively 
find the next hop address. Only when the deepest layer is peeled off will 
the final destination—the recipient hop/node—become visible.209 
Since first being successfully implemented, the lightning network 
has been used in an exponentially increasing number of applications—
thus automatically expanding the scope of indirect channels.210 Since 
July 23, 2019, over 4,000 of the roughly 9,000 “reachable” nodes in the 
Bitcoin network were lightning network enabled, generating 32,588 
channels with a network capacity of 904.04 BTC for transfer.211 The 
original form of lightning network now has several variant 
implementations, based on recommendations received from the 
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developers of the Bitcoin community. 212  While similar applications, 
such as Ethereum’s Raiden Network, have been developed, the lightning 
network is still considered to be the most technologically advanced two-
layer off-chain solution utilizing HTLC-based smart contract.213 
We propose use of lightning networks in a DLT network for 
securities trading and settlement in order (1) to achieve the latency 
necessary for the real-time synchronization of bid/ask queues from 
order-matching platforms and (2) to allow broker-dealers to change their 
positions during an intra-day period prior to actual settlement. 
Information is crucial to the operation of securities markets, and the 
network protocol can be designed along the following lines to ensure 
proper channeling of information: 
1. Confidential data transmission tête-à-tête will be permitted 
between transacting parties using onion style routing to 
communicate broker-dealer trading history and asset positions to 
order-matching platforms. 
2. A public broadcast of data through ordinary routing would be used 
for communication of the bid/ask queues to the network participants. 
3. Different types of information would be known only to select 
nodes to ensure that confidential trading strategies are not broadcast 
to the network. This can be implemented either by onion style 
multicasting or by traditional multicasting. In both cases, the same 
packet is to be sent to selected final destinations, such as evidence of 
transactions in a given security sent to issuers at end-of-day for 
purposes of settlement. 
In the market structure model proposed here, lightning networks 
would be used to (i) give every broker-dealer of the DLT network an 
instantaneous copy of pre- and post-trade pricing information from the 
order books of all matching venues, (ii) feed all order-matching 
platforms real-time information about the cash, assets and trading 
positions of each broker-dealer node within the DLT network for risk 
management purposes, and (iii) allow broker-dealers to place orders on 
any platform and hold their matched trades on the second layer intra-
day, freeing them to enter or exit any position during the trading day and 
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prior to actual settlement, at which time the transactions would be 
memorialized in the underlying ledger. 
III. CONFIGURING A DLT NETWORK FOR SECURITIES MARKETS 
A. WHY AND HOW TO CHANGE THE EXISTING MARKET STRUCTURE 
As discussed in the introduction to this Article, the currently 
dominant model for securities markets can be considered efficient if one 
accepts the fragmentation of pricing and disruption of ownership that 
significantly impair the rights of investors, issuers and smaller broker-
dealers. On the other hand, if a securities market were to be based on 
DLT, the basic structure of the protocol would make identical 
information available to every node, although such access could be 
intentionally segregated to preserve confidentiality, as explained below. 
The main argument against using a DLT network is its famously high 
latency, but as explained in Part II, supra, this can be reduced to current 
market speed through use of a private network combined with a layer 2 
lightning network. 
The primary concern remaining is then to decide whether the 
current state of the market justifies a major infrastructural change.214 To 
decide this fairly, it is necessary to recognize how costs and benefits are 
currently compared: the present model puts its costs on issuers, investors 
and smaller broker-dealers—who have little influence over 
infrastructure design— while yielding benefit for the largest market 
participants who control the design process.215 Moreover, as Mainelli 
and Milne point out, restructuring the market with DLT presents 
“substantial (although as yet unquantified) costs in the short to medium 
term while the anticipated benefits lie largely in the relatively distant 
future.”216 Incurring cost today in order to enjoy benefit tomorrow is not 
a virtue readily practiced in contemporary society, as anyone working 
on climate change or pension systems can explain. 217  Yet, when a 
specific structural evolution can bring wide-spread benefit but is 
blocked by powerful interests extracting rents from existing 
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inefficiency, the matter is ripe for regulatory intervention.218 Embedded 
benefits for larger broker-dealers argue strongly against their unbiased 
leadership to promote fundamental overhaul. 219  Negative system 
externalities borne by issuers and investors and competitive 
disadvantages borne by smaller broker-dealers argue for a regulatory 
intervention.220 
We are not alone in advocating a realignment of securities markets 
towards the interests of issuers and investors. Mattli marshals a book-
length study to advocate “a simpler and more transparent marketplace 
that better serves the interests of investors than today’s opaque and 
highly fragmented markets,” although he sees it arising from a natural 
consolidation of exchanges.221 Micheler and van der Hayde argue, as we 
do, that securities settlement should be more transparent and less 
oriented toward the interests of financial intermediaries.222  However, 
they do not yet examine in detail how DLT will achieve this, stating, 
“let us assume for the purpose of this article, that computer science can 
deliver an un-intermediated ledger allowing investors to hold and 
transfer securities and money in real time.”223 Avgouleas and Kiayias 
also make a similar political economic argument against rent extraction 
by market structure controllers, but in discussing the application of 
DLT, limit themselves to pointing out generically how DLT could shift 
some of the volume of derivatives clearing to the DLT network, 
diminishing the importance of the CCP.224 The same argument could be 
made for using multiple global depositories rather than a CSD cum CCP. 
The very significant impediment to straightening out the markets so 
that they best serve the interests of all constituencies is, as Mainelli and 
Milne observe, that achieving “substantial potential gains of using 
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mutual distributed ledgers in settlement” will require both “coordinated 
and widespread change in operational processes across all the major 
public markets” and “a substantial reengineering” of existing 
arrangements.225 Such reengineering on behalf of system outsiders has 
occasionally been successful in the past on a limited scale, such as in the 
founding of IEX to help institutional investors limit the damages 
inflicted by high frequency trading. 226  Any such reorganization of 
markets, however, must understand the numerous and interconnected, 
deep structural problems in the current system and ensure that they are 
not merely shifted into an automated existence through “network 
protocol” of a future DLT-based system.227 
If a DLT-based settlement framework could conquer 
“fragmentation” and obviate “indirect holding,” its introduction would 
bring sorely needed improvement to the financial system.228 To achieve 
this, the bid/ask queues of disparate order-matching platforms would 
have to be replicated in a dispersed manner, and the settlement system 
would have to return the sole power to create securities to the issuers.229 
The permissioned DLT network we propose to achieve this would have 
three different and distinct types of nodes with three different types of 
information and authority: order-matching platforms, broker-dealers, 
and securities issuers. It would thus be very different than the self-
sufficient and mostly egalitarian Bitcoin blockchain.230 
A concentration of liquidity would arise from the nature of the DLT 
network itself because in a distributed ledger, each node holds a 
complete copy of the ledger. 231  The greatest weakness of having 
multiple platforms match trades in a given set of securities is that each 
platform develops an isolated set of price data that inevitably deviates 
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from those of other platforms. If trades are conducted on separate 
venues which are all nodes of the same DLT network, this fragmentation 
would not arise, although the platforms could still compete on their 
fees.232 As discussed below, the latency of the synchronization process 
would be dramatically reduced by running the matching system on a 
second, “lightning” layer of a permissioned network. Under the network 
protocol, matching platforms, as nodes of the DLT network, would be 
given full authority over the creation of matched trades.233 
Transparency of ownership would be the immediate result of 
returning securities to the issuers’ books and no longer treating them as 
something endogenous to the financial system.234 Transparent ownership 
is already provided for in existing corporate and commercial law.235 The 
laws governing both corporations and registered instruments—whether 
shares or debentures—give investors legal title to and status under the 
instrument purchased through registration of the owner’s name.236 But a 
settlement system that governs such instruments by full application of 
corporate and commercial law, rather than depository account rules or 
hybrid rules designed for the latter—i.e., “security entitlement” 
provisions—would enable investors to once again become fully 
empowered and visible owners. 
The operating protocol of a DLT network designed for dependence 
on the real-world origination and ownership of securities could not be 
one that independently determines the creation of securities the way it 
does for Bitcoin. In the permissioned system proposed here, issuers 
would be given final authority over the creation and transfer of 
securities traded in the DLT network. 
Other important changes would result from the proposed 
restructuring, in particular with regard to risk management. As already 
mentioned, the various functions of the system—as well as the given 
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latency constraints of public networks—would demand that the DLT 
network be private/permissioned, perhaps operated by a federation of 
leading trading venues, broker-dealers, and issuers.237 
The addition of a layer 2 lightning network should bring processing 
speed up to a level at which order-matching platforms could 
automatically scan and analyze the trading, cash, and asset positions of 
broker-dealers before executing orders.238 This would allow the market’s 
risk management mechanism to operate prophylactically, rather than 
post hoc, through a CCP designed merely to contain the blast of default. 
While such use of the DLT network to perform CCP risk management 
functions does not go as far as the extension into smart corporate and 
regulatory compliance mechanisms suggested by Lee, its pre-emptory 
nature does improve upon the current technique of absorbing default.239 
The model proposed here would thus (i) give order-matching 
venues power to reject an order if its originator shows an insufficient 
asset position, (ii) empower the network protocol to block and extract 
assets for purposes of execution and settlement, and (iii) use a smart 
contract risk allocation arrangement among broker-dealers to absorb the 
impact of defaults that escape preventative screening. 
The following subsections examine the manner in which a DLT-
based securities settlement system can be used to reconstitute unified 
pricing across the market, restore transparency of asset ownership, and 
reduce settlement risk. 
B. OVERCOMING FRAGMENTATION OF LIQUIDITY AND INFORMATION 
Liquidity is directly linked to network externalities, so that a higher 
number of buyers and sellers actively engaging in procurement and 
disposal of assets on a given order-matching venue will generally lead to 
higher liquidity.240  A similar relationship exists for transparency and 
information: the more information that can be grasped from a given 
standpoint, the higher the level of transparency.241 If all order-matching 
platforms active in a market are made nodes in that market’s DLT 
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trading and settlement network, the bid/ask queue maintained by each 
platform would be distributed within the identical copies of the ledger 
maintained by all other nodes in the network.242 The distributed nature 
of the technology constituting the framework on which communication 
and matching of orders is based would itself unify pricing data and 
overcome market fragmentation. 243  One might even consider linking 
multiple markets—such as equity and futures—on a single DLT 
network. 
Today, market participants demand that trading be as close as 
possible to instant, which makes latency crucial. Orders should be 
transmitted, read, and executed instantly, and post-trade data showing 
execution price should also be instantly available. This can be achieved 
by hosting each order-matching node on a layer 2 lightning network, 
which is capable of providing latency as low as existing, non-DLT 
technology. The layer 2 would still enjoy the cryptographic protection of 
public and private keys, but would not suffer from the time-consuming 
consensus process.244 This will not be problematic, as it will be within a 
private/permissioned network in which nodes have assigned 
authorities.245 Although data updated to the millisecond—rather than the 
microsecond—may not meet all needs of high frequency traders, it 
should be satisfactory for most market participants and for regulators, 
who would receive much better information than proposed to be 
available through the CAT, for which T+1 aggregation of data to the 
regulator is the goal.246 
C. TRANSPARENT HOLDINGS THROUGH DLT 
Securities, whether shares of stock or debt instruments, come into 
existence when issued by the entity against which claims embodied by 
the securities may be exercised.247 The issuing entity or its agent are 
responsible for recording the securities’ existence, which takes place 
under either corporate law or contract law, depending on whether shares 
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or debt are being issued.248 This genesis is very different from that of a 
cryptocurrency unit, which comes into existence when nodes comply 
with rules embedded in the protocol of its native DLT network.249 It is 
also very different from the permitted creation of securities through 
book-entry in the indirect holding system.250 
Securities traded or settled on a DLT network could not be fully 
network-endogenous without giving the network protocol free reign to 
create these securities. 251  Thus, securities traded on a DLT network 
should originate according to an authority exogenous to the network 
protocol, that is, the records constituting their existence must not be 
determined by the network alone.252 The challenge for any securities 
settlement system aspiring to utilize transparent ownership is to allow 
ownership records to be held authoritatively by the issuer while 
simultaneously permitting such records to be altered by a robust transfer 
of title at low latency in connection with market trades.253 Some ideas 
currently aired about how securities settlement could work on DLT 
appear to assume that the DLT network would control the creation of 
securities just as the Bitcoin blockchain controls the origination of 
Bitcoin and securities intermediaries currently control the creation of 
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shadow securities by book-entry “security entitlements.” If such a model 
were implemented, the distortions of ownership and transparency caused 
by the indirect holding system would be perpetuated.254 
To achieve transparency and restore property rights, traded 
securities should exist as “uncertificated securities” on the books of the 
issuer, and the purchasing broker-dealer should have authority to 
instruct the transfer to its name or the name of its client upon presenting 
evidence of a confirmed trade executed within the DLT network. The 
ultimate transfer would take place only on the books of the issuer (its 
register of shareholders or bondholders). The book-entry of an 
uncertificated security in the name of its owner constitutes full and 
negotiable transfer for purposes of commercial law and would create full 
and transparent entry of ownership for purposes of corporate law or the 
laws governing relations among bondholders.255 
D. AN INITIAL MODEL FOR A DLT NETWORK 
As outlined in Figure 4 below, a DLT network could be used as the 
base infrastructure for a securities market in which order-matching 
platforms, broker-dealers, and issuers are nodes. The network would 
have two layers, one consisting of the underlying DLT and a second 
consisting of a lightning network. The order-matching platforms as 
nodes of the DLT network would also operate on the lightning network, 
which would allow both their instant receipt of the asset positions of 
broker-dealer nodes and the replication of all bid/ask queues. Broker-
dealers would have to report cash and security account data to the 
lightning network and have authority to initiate and confirm trades on 
the lightning and underlying networks. They would receive information 
only about their own positions and the existing queue, with no access to 
the trading history or asset positions of competitors. Issuers would be 
nodes of the DLT network with ultimate authority to register the 
existence and transfer of their own securities. They would receive 
information on matched trades in their securities for end of day 
settlement on the underlying ledger. 
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The overall system as sketched out in Figure 4 would require: 
(i) A private/permissioned DLT network in which order matching 
platforms, broker-dealers and issuers are nodes with different roles, 
authorities and information received; 
(ii) Network protocol and design would be controlled by a private 
federation, probably of leading broker-dealers, matching platforms 
and issuers; 
(iii) The broker-dealers would have authority only to make orders 
and confirm transfers; 
(iv) The order-matching platforms would have authority only to 
match, or refuse to match, orders into a trade, creating a claim 
against the seller for securities and a claim against the buyer for 
cash; 
(v) The issuers would have sole authority to create securities and 
register the transfer of the same on the ledger, pursuant to the 
consensus confirmation of broker-dealers; 
(vi) Banks would remain outside of the DLT network but be 
connected to report cash balances of participants and by smart 
contracts triggering disbursement of cash in connection with verified 
and confirmed trades as well as loss allocation payments; 
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(vii) Registration of transfer and release of cash would happen 
simultaneously pursuant to the DLT network protocol upon 
confirmation at end-of-day, creating strict delivery versus payment 
(DvP). 
The system would have to be Turing-complete in order to support 
smart contracts.256 If crypto assets are to be accepted as an alternative to 
cash, the system should also include HTLC or lightning network 
facilities supporting atomic swaps between the cryptocurrency network 
and the securities trading network.257 
In the proposed model, each matching platform would run an order-
matching engine that applies the standard “price-time priority” matching 
algorithm, just as in existing exchanges.258 Instead of being novated into 
twin contracts through insertion of a CCP, the matched trade would be 
fed into the DLT network for end-of-day settlement. Institution 
identifiers used in the order submission and order-matching system to 
track buyer and seller would translate into identifiers on the DLT 
network. The “escrow” function of the CCP—which has access to funds 
and can guaranty payment—would be performed by the protocol of the 
DLT network, which would earmark funds and securities for delivery. 
The information fed over the lightning network to each order-matching 
platform for risk management purposes would include the reduction of 
available assets and cash stemming from such current trading. 
Implementation of the proposed DLT framework would thus not only 
obviate the U.S. CAT project and the EU need for consolidated tape 
providers with respect to pricing data, but it would also bring derivative-
market-quality risk management to the equity market.259 
Every broker-dealer node of the DLT network for trading and 
settlement would have to register securities and cash accounts within the 
                                                                                                                 
 256. “Turing completeness” is the power of any device or system to emulate a 
Turing Machine, i.e., the capability of data-manipulation rule set (such as a computer’s 
instruction set, a cellular automaton or a programming language). See RAUCHS ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 51. 
 257. However, these technologies are still in their infancy and much improvement is 
required before they can be used in a large-scale system. In fact, both traditional 
banking system and atomic swaps for crypto assets can be applied in parallel. See Miraz 
& Donald, Atomic Swap, supra note 138, at 48. 
 258. That is, best price is matched first and if two orders bid or ask the same price, 
then first to arrive in the system is matched first. See SCHWARTZ & FRANCIONI, supra 
note 3, at 164. 
 259. See Donald, Block Lords, supra note 20, at 34. 
2019] MULTILATERAL TRANSPARENCY 145 
FOR SECURITIES MARKETS THROUGH DLT 
network. This is identical to what is now done on securities exchanges, 
and from a functional point of view would be similar to a multi-
signature “wallet” used in a cryptocurrency exchange. This information 
would be held at the level of the lightning network and be visible to 
every order-matching node to which such broker-dealer is eligible to 
submit a buy or sell order. This information would not be visible to 
other broker-dealers or issuers. The information would allow the order-
matching node to verify the existence of assets prior to matching, 
serving a gate-keeping risk management function, while shielding it 
from use by competing traders. 
Because the bid/ask queue of each order-matching venue would be 
held on the lightning network, pricing information on any asset sold on 
many such venues would be instantly consolidated, eliminating 
fragmentation of price discovery. The lightning network would 
temporarily record each matched trade, making it available for broadcast 
to the other broker-dealer nodes for consensus and incorporation into the 
DLT settlement network at end of day. The transfer of ownership rights 
recorded on the lightning network is bi-directional and thus transfers 
could be performed an unlimited number of times before the channel is 
closed at end of day, which would allow traders to enter and exit an 
asset as often as they like before close of trading, at which point only the 
net result would be fixed, broadcast, and registered. At end of day, the 
lightning channel would close, and the broker-dealers’ final balances 
would be broadcasted to the network nodes for consensus and 
registration in the base ledger. Funds and securities would then be 
delivered definitively through the network by entry into the relevant 
registers and accounts. 
It is important to make trade commitments immediately visible 
without requiring every participant to settle its trades immediately.260 
Immediate delivery does not correspond to the wishes of most market 
participants, and because some early DLT proposals for securities 
settlement included such immediacy they were deemed undesirable.261 
Securities trading does not have the sole purpose of obtaining actual 
delivery and long-term retention of securities. Harvesting price changes 
intra-day may be the sole target of most trades. Attempting to eliminate 
                                                                                                                 
 260. See Avgouleas & Kiayias, supra note 222, at 52. 
 261. This reality of markets is pointed out by Mainelli, supra note 14, at 14, who 
also observe correctly that the legacy securities settlement framework also allows near 
real-time settlement. 
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such “speculative” trading would be an unacceptable, normative 
intrusion into the nature of securities markets.262 It is all but impossible 
to separate speculation from investment, despite history’s best efforts to 
do so.263 
With current arrangements for end-of-day settlement or batch 
settlement intra-day, and rules allowing T+2 or T+3 settlement, traders 
can be in and out of an asset hundreds of times before actually having to 
pay out cash or deliver securities.264 This agile character of securities 
markets is something neither broker-dealers nor institutional investors 
would want to give up. To address this, in our proposed model, 
settlement—i.e., delivery of cash and securities through consensus of 
ledger nodes—would occur only when full confirmation through 
consensus occurs at end of day (or at the close of another specified 
cycle), triggering transfer of assets on the ledger at that time. Thus, 
purchase of a given security at day’s open would earmark cash 
necessary for that purchase in the DLT lightning network, but a sale of 
that same security at midday would adjust the balance, perhaps 
indicating a cash credit for the broker-dealer who was in and out of the 
asset. 
Lightning networks could thus allow order-matching platforms to 
assume a risk management role similar to a CCP in addition to allowing 
the pricing data held by these platforms to be aggregated in real time 
without asking market participants to fundamentally reform their 
approaches to securities trading. Because the lightning network 
transactions would not be permanently recorded in the ledger, a function 
comparable in some ways to the current system of netting could also be 
achieved, as the actual delivery activity could be substantially less than 
                                                                                                                 
 262. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST AND MONEY 260 (1936). 
 263. The desirability of eliminating “speculative” trading has been discussed long 
and often without approaching resolution. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL 
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 101 (1936) (“Speculators may do no 
harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when 
enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation”). Current efforts focus on 
transaction taxes, which would essentially allow traders themselves distinguish between 
trades they find necessary and unnecessary in light of the tax cost per trade. See Richard 
Rubin, Democrats Aim for Financial-Transaction Tax, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-aim-for-financial-transactions-tax-
11551818240 [https://perma.cc/8H53-ZRVW]. 
 264. Mainelli, supra note 14, at 27. 
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the trading activity. The settlement at end of day would occur under a 
strict rule of delivery versus payment (DvP). As in current systems, 
participants would have cash accounts linked to the DLT network, and 
the ledger protocol would be coded with a function to confirm 
availability of funds. Both securities and funds would remain network 
exogenous, even when transferred to the seller’s account. 
However, the system could also be designed to allow 
cryptocurrency or other colored tokens as a medium of payment. In such 
cases, atomic swaps—preferably powered by HTLC and a lightning 
network—can be applied to confirm the availability of required funds 
instead of using third-party guarantors such as banks.265 
The actual delivery of securities in fulfillment of trades would be a 
key improvement of the DLT model. Transactions would be received 
from the matching engine and broadcasted to the broker-dealer’s party 
to the transaction and the issuer of the relevant securities as nodes of the 
network. Participating broker-dealers, which would be system nodes in 
this permissioned network, would perform consensus verification of 
each received contract and ensuing transfer through an automatic 
reconciliation of their trade records and the data broadcast to the 
settlement system at end of day.266 This consensus verification would be 
limited to actual transfers to be settled and would not require that the 
trading history of any broker-dealer be made known to the market. 
Validation of transfer would trigger release of buyer’s funds. Once a 
transfer of securities is validated and confirmed, the transaction would 
be broadcast to the DLT network for definitive registration in a process 
undertaken by the issuer.267 Although the issuer would undertake such 
                                                                                                                 
 265. See Miraz & Donald, Atomic Swap, supra note 138, at 43; see also Miraz & 
Donald, LApps, supra note 198, at 187. 
 266. While we are proposing end-of-day settlement, there is no reason why the same 
system could not operate on “batches,” perhaps at mid-day, end-of-day and evening, or 
even on eight-hour cycles, if this were made necessary by trading hours. 
 267. Alternatively, similar to “Coinbase” transactions in a permissioned DLT 
system for securities settlement, the protocol could be designed so that the authority to 
create (issue) new shares by booking them on the main DLT trading network itself can 
be assigned to issuers as designated party, without consensus or external approval. This 
would address the problems associated with over-issued “shadow” securities created by 
intermediaries and depositories, but would unnecessarily distance the power to transfer 
securities from the transactions necessitating such transfer. We see the checks and 
balances arising from broker-dealer consensus together with issuer authority over the 
ledger change as better promoting transparency and avoiding moral hazard arising from 
conflicts of interest. 
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registration, it would be required by the network protocol. As such, the 
issuer would not be in a position to refuse transfer. 
The trading and settlement system would therefore have four 
layers: (i) a central connecting DLT network operated by all 
participating broker-dealers, (ii) order-matching platforms receiving 
information on all broker-dealers submitting orders, (iii) a cash transfer 
system, and (iv) network nodes controlled by issuers on which securities 
originate and reside. As discussed above, the securities would thus 
remain exogenous to the primary settlement network, residing as 
uncertificated securities in a register controlled by the issuer. This 
register could be changed only with permission of the relevant listed 
issuer, which would also have the sole power to create any new shares 
through lawful issue. The securities traded would exist electronically 
and only in one place, so there would be no need to double- or multiple-
book “shadow” securities within the broker-dealers’ accounts.268  The 
sole register in which the securities exist would allow complete 
transparency of ownership.269 
E. SHIFTING CCP FUNCTIONS INTO ORDER-MATCHING PLATFORMS 
As noted above, an additional benefit of the proposed model would 
be the ability to shift the risk management functions of CCPs to order-
matching platforms, thus making this function preventative rather than 
remedial.270 In order to achieve this, order-matching platforms would 
need to receive the day’s trading history and asset positions—cash and 
securities—on every broker-dealer that submits an order. This would be 
similar to the information received by the CCP of a derivatives 
                                                                                                                 
 268. As Martin points out, once securities are truly dematerialized and exist only in 
registered form, any secondary or tertiary accounts containing booked claims referring 
to the original account booking are unnecessary and dangerous, risking the creation of 
securities that have no validity. Martin, supra note 71, at 70. 
 269. It should be noted that we are referring to voluntary transparency, that is, 
transparency which is not destroyed automatically by the market infrastructure. The 
choice of a given shareholder to register ownership in the name of a trust or use an 
anonymous investor identifier would remain possible under our proposed model, and 
the desirability of such actions for tax or other purposes goes beyond the range of this 
paper. On this last topic, see Delphine Nougayrède, Towards a Global Financial 
Register? The Case for End Investor Transparency in Central Securities Depositories, 
4 J. OF FIN. REG. 276 (2018). 
 270. See Avgouleas & Kiayias, supra note 222, at 8. 
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market. 271  Given the properties of lightning networks, delivery, and 
processing of this information should be possible within acceptable 
latency for a securities market. The “processing” in question would be 
an automatic assessment of risk, and a rejection of any order whose 
execution entails a risk profile outside of the acceptable parameters set 
at start-of-trading—and perhaps adjusted intra-day—for the matching 
engine. 
The proposed model contains obvious advantages. Even with all its 
power and financial backing, the CCP on a contemporary stock market 
can only react to and absorb the default of system participants on their 
obligations to perform existing contracts, stemming systemic risk 
through its extensive capital backing. 272  Risk management will be 
greatly improved by the introduction of an intelligent preventative gate, 
as is currently done with margin requirement adjustments on a 
derivatives exchange. Closing the door to questionable trades ex ante 
would not only eliminate risk preventatively, but also encourage trading 
participants to better monitor their asset positions on a running basis 
rather than collapsing and having the force of their default blunted by 
the CCP through bulk of its “unlimited” funds.273 In the proposed DLT 
network, the order-matching platforms would add a screening of risk 
management derived from the trading and asset position of broker-
dealers to their standard “price and time” algorithm, matching those 
with acceptable positions and rejecting others. Knocking an order with 
insufficient backing out of the queue would allow the trading system to 
replace currently remedial damage reduction with preventative risk 
exclusion. 
A final concern remains.274 What if a broker-dealer has a large, 
undisclosed position in another market or off-market and a large loss for 
that broker-dealer occurs after the matching platform approves another 
trade on the DLT network? As this could not be dealt with by the 
preventative information feed within the DLT network, a traditional 
default containment backup like a CCP would have to be created. This 
could be achieved in a way essentially identical to the current guaranty 
                                                                                                                 
 271. See RULES OF HONG KONG FUTURES EXCHANGE LIMITED 616-632A (2018), 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/Services/Rules-and-Forms-and-
Fees/Rules/HKFE/Rules/fe_vi.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/S33D-BY92]. 
 272. See Avgouleas & Kiayias, supra note 222, at 8. 
 273. See Lee, supra note 228, at 11. 
 274. We would like to thank Mathias Bock for raising and stressing this issue at a 
seminar we offered for the Hong Kong Law Society. 
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funds and risk allocation payments used to fund CCPs. Such payments 
are made by the network of broker-dealers acting as clearing 
participants, and can vary both in relation to the trading activity of the 
contributor and the source and dimension of the default. 275  In the 
proposed DLT network, a loss allocation agreement could be entered 
into by all market participants and enforced though smart contracts, so 
that in the case of default, payments as pre-agreed could be drawn in 
proper proportion from the cash accounts of the broker-dealer 
participants. This would function just like the current backing of a CCP, 
with the only difference being that the network of contributing 
participants would be unified by the DLT protocol rather than by a stock 
corporation acting as CCP. 
F. INCREASING DIRECT HOLDINGS DECREASES THE QUANTUM OF 
NETTING 
Part I.D explained that the high proportion of transactions currently 
netted out in traditional securities settlement systems corresponds to the 
high proportion of securities legally owned by apex institutions within 
the securities market. If 99 percent of securities are held in custody by a 
CSD, then 99 percent of transfers could take place between the accounts 
of participants in the CSD, and it will be possible to net out crossing 
obligations among those participants, thereby dramatically reducing the 
number of actual deliveries necessary at the apex of the system. 
Claims by lower level investors against the CSD’s participants and 
their client local brokers, however, will still have to be established and 
documented, although these transaction costs do not currently count as 
“settlement” because the lower level investors never actually own the 
securities. This means that the figure of 99 percent reduction of delivery 
costs is somewhat deceptive. In a market where each investor actually 
owns securities rather than holding an indistinct claim against upper 
level institutions, netting would be dramatically be reduced. Only 
mutual and fungible obligations can be netted, so a greater number of 
actual owners results in lower mutuality. Commonality of obligations 
                                                                                                                 
 275. See, e.g., Edwin Budding and David Murphy, “Design Choices in Central 
Clearing: Issues Facing Small Advanced Economies,” 31 (Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand Analytical Notes series AN2014/08, Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2014)), 
https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/ReserveBank/Files/Publications/Analytical%20notes 
/2014/an2014-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K5F-Q72K]. 
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would only remain among institutions engaged in high-volume 
proprietary trading. Ordinary investors would likely have no such 
commonality. Therefore, a reduction in declared netting volume should 
not be understood as a significant increase in actual transaction costs for 
the market. 
With regard to actual transaction costs, because the proposal 
outlined here envisages settlement taking place on the ledger at end of 
day, traders could enter and exit an asset any number of times through 
trades on the lightning network intraday without performing on 
settlement. During the period between trade matching and asset 
delivery, the trade would remain off-chain in the second, “lightning” 
layer of the network discussed in Part II. By keeping securities trades 
away from the base layer of the DLT network until close of day, the 
lightning network would allow speculative trading with near-zero 
latency and minimal transaction fees leading up to settlement. This 
would reduce transaction costs by allowing traders to achieve a net 
effect—plus or minus any cash difference resulting from price 
changes—at end of day if they effectively reverse their positions. When 
the channel is closed at end of day, only the netted result of the 
transactions entered into by a market participant would be locked in and 
broadcast to the network for consensus. 
CONCLUSION 
Use of a DLT network for securities market infrastructure promises 
to solve the serious problems of fragmentation and disrupted ownership 
troubling markets today, both of which also prevent market 
transparency. These problems arise from the legacy infrastructure and its 
natural evolution away from physical trading venues to a constellation 
of electronic platforms. Although the market model used today is fast, 
secure, and cheap for the largest broker-dealers, its basic configuration 
seriously damages the interests of other constituencies in the market—
including investors, issuers, and smaller broker-dealers. 
The DLT network model proposed in this Article would allow 
disparate data gathered by a large number of matching queues to be 
aggregated into a copy of a ledger available to all nodes. The order-
matching platforms acting as nodes of the DLT network could compete 
with each other without fragmenting pricing data, which would be 
synchronized automatically by the ledger protocol. In a 
private/permissioned network, the different participants in the trading 
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and settlement system could be given distinct roles and authority. Thus, 
the broker-dealers would be given access to bid/ask queue information, 
but not the trading and asset positions of other broker-dealers. The 
issuers of securities traded would also be nodes of the network with sole 
authority to create securities and power to effect transfer of securities to 
settle trades at day’s end. The problem of “shadow securities” created by 
financial institutions booking securities to account would no longer 
exist, and ownership of the securities traded would be direct and 
transparent because evidenced only on the register controlled by the 
issuer of the relevant securities. Broker-dealers would continue to be the 
most active agents in the market, with sole authority to initiate orders to 
the order-matching platforms and confirm trades for transfer on the 
network to the issuer nodes. 
Beyond solving the basic problems of fragmentation, ownership, 
and transparency, the proposed model could improve the current risk 
management functions now undertaken remedially by the CCP. A 
precondition of node membership for all broker-dealers would be to 
make assets and cash dedicated to trading visible to the system. On the 
basis of this knowledge and the day’s trading history, each order-
matching platform would screen for default risk while processing the 
standard price-time priority algorithm. In this way, risk management 
would become prophylactic rather than remedial. The DLT protocol 
would not share this risk management data with broker-dealers, and all 
trading participants would agree to pay in automatically apportioned 
guaranty funds if default occurs despite the preventative screening. 
Thus, existing remedial action would remain available, although its use 
would be much less probable. 
A serious problem of DLT networks can be latency, which is often 
too high for efficient securities trading; this also renders the network 
incapable of adequate scaling. To address this, we recommend using a 
private network that obviates the PoW consensus process and employs a 
“lightning network” layer parallel to the DLT network, which would 
allow intraday functions to occur instantaneously. Information about 
orders queued and trades executed on all order-matching nodes would 
be synchronized via this lightning network. These contracts would 
remain on the lightning network and would be part of the data fed to the 
order-matching platforms intra-day, but as settlement would not be 
instantaneous, traders could reverse positions without limit until close of 
trading. At that moment, a close-of-day confirmation process through 
consensus would bring all standing contracts into settlement and transfer 
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of ownership on the registers controlled by security issuer nodes, 
making the transfers permanent records. 
While a reorganization of this magnitude would be highly unusual 
in a system that works well for its leading broker-dealers, it would 
benefit investors and issuers and smaller broker-dealers. Given the 
manner in which markets are designed and built under the leadership of 
the largest market participants, regulators should perform their duty to 
protect the weaker constituents in the broader market and seriously 
consider implementing the more just and transparent arrangement that 
technology now allows. 
